If I could have everyone in American academia read one book, it would be The Black Book of Communism. Every Democrat should read it. Jacques has brought it up here before.
Here's a short take from the Amazon.com page:
Amazon.com Review
When it was first published in France in 1997, Le livre noir du Communisme touched off a storm of controversy that continues to rage today. Even some of his contributors shied away from chief editor Stéphane Courtois's conclusion that Communism, in all its many forms, was morally no better than Nazism; the two totalitarian systems, Courtois argued, were far better at killing than at governing, as the world learned to its sorrow.
Communism did kill, Courtois and his fellow historians demonstrate, with ruthless efficiency: 25 million in Russia during the Bolshevik and Stalinist eras, perhaps 65 million in China under the eyes of Mao Zedong, 2 million in Cambodia, millions more Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America--an astonishingly high toll of victims. This freely expressed penchant for homicide, Courtois maintains, was no accident, but an integral trait of a philosophy, and a practical politics, that promised to erase class distinctions by erasing classes and the living humans that populated them. Courtois and his contributors document Communism's crimes in numbing detail, moving from country to country, revolution to revolution. The figures they offer will likely provoke argument, if not among cliometricians then among the ideologically inclined. So, too, will Courtois's suggestion that those who hold Lenin, Trotsky, and Ho Chi Minh in anything other than contempt are dupes, witting or not, of a murderous school of thought--one that, while in retreat around the world, still has many adherents. A thought-provoking work of history and social criticism, The Black Book of Communism fully merits the broadest possible readership and discussion. --Gregory McNamee
If I were able to slip a book into Obama's hands (as he let Chavez do at one meeting) it would be the Black Book of Communism. Ditto for his propaganda minister, Anita Dumb-Dumb.
Monday, October 26, 2009
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And to think--notwithstanding 20th century history, some still believe an omnipotent, just Deity exists who allowed Maoist aggression and tyranny--(and Hitler, Stalin, Ottoman turks, Nixon/Kissinger, mormons, etc).
Kirby—
I can't imagine why you think that giving every academic a copy of the "Black Book of Communism" would make the slightest impact.
1. Everyone know that ostensibly communist regimes have killed millions. So this part of the book is uninformative.
2. Although Kirby classifies everyone to the left of Vlad the Impaler as communist, most academics consider themselves "leftists," or perhaps "socialists." Academics who consider themselves to be "big C Communists" aren't all that common anymore. For academics who are not "big C Communists," the critique will be meaningless—the book isn't talking to or about them. Moreover, if you look at the successful western socialist states (France, Sweden, etc.), there evidence is strongly against generalizing the critique it presents of communist states to socialist states.
3. For the few "big C Communists" out there, they'd probably take the position that offing a few counter-revolutionaries is the cost of progress. Even if "a few" is measured in the mid-eight digits. Note that I don't advocate this position, I'm just saying that if you have those commitments, you probably already know the corollaries, and have made peace with them one way or another.
Let me put it this way:
There's an interesting book out there that talks about justice, about how to live in community, about the desirability of mercy, etc. It talks a lot about the faults of pride and selfishness that each of us struggle with. Yet a lot of people who read the book manage to consistently misinterpret it as talking about how bad everyone but them is, and about how right it is for them to judge everyone else for their failings, even though the book itself says "judge not, lest you be judged."
I think that this book ought to get more attention, even by those who think they know it well.
The whole "judge not, lest you be judged" thing is a pet peeve of mine. Stu, I don't know if you are using it this way, but there are many others who use it as a mighty, orthodoxy-slaying sword. Not only that, it ruthlessly enforces silence! No judgments can be rightly rendered, therefore any attempt to speak about truth is wickedness. Better by far to speak about feelings and personal experience.
The trouble with this, of course, is that it isn't true! Whereas casting judgment on your neighbors willy-nilly while worshiping at your own shrine of self-justification is clearly condemned in New Testament writings, caring enough to correct your neighbor (in love!) and to fight for the truth against error is emphasized even more.
"Judge not, lest you be judged" has been appropriated by people who are all too happy to judge others on the basis of their own assumptions. It is trotted out before the battle in the hopes that their orthodox opponents will disarm themselves.
Kirby:
Thanks for posting on this important work published in 1997 (I read the original French edition at the U of Washington before Harvard U P issued a translation)--all done by area specialists and edited by Stephane Courtois, research director at the most prestigious scholarly social science research institute in France (the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, or CNRS).
Le Livre Noir du Communisme set powder-puff faineant Left-Bank leftists and their fellow-travelling comrades in Europe and the States back on their heels before their pathetic face-saving attempts at nitpicking at the work allowed them the precious asset of dismissing it with a proletarian sneer or at least a ho-humming complacency (witness stu's jejeune and ignorant remarks above) that among the dozens of murderous and fiendishly oppressive Marxist "experiments" round the globe, they were mere "perversions" of "Platonic" Marxism, so popular a self-delusion in our own academic and journalistic circles.
At any rate, in highlighting the supposed "one-sided" claim about Courtois' work, the Wikipedia entry on the work is itself an example of one-sided critical bias. On the other hand, the best review of the book I've read to date is that of Martin Malia (of U C Berkeley) in the Times Literary Supplement. In this review Malia unabashedly more than equates the horrors perpetrated by Communist regimes with those of the Nazis.
I remember reading some featured fellow-travelling twit in the ever-more-mendacious and malicious NYT summing up the aftermath (in 1991) of the Bolshevik "experiment" in Russia with an unironic "thanks for trying! [?!!]." For
trying WHAT, pray tell?
An actual reading of the work goes far beyond listing numbers of victims, and I'd invite ho-hummers like stu to push his nose in it a bit before sounding off about it. For actually the work richly documents and specifically details exactly HOW the communists and their complacent allies and dupes perpetrated and allowed to happen the systematic atrocities committed by these horrific regimes and individual tyrants. If indeed he HAS read the work, his above comments are even more self-damaging. But I'll charitably assume he hasn't. . . .
A reading of this important work by Obama and his admin minions might indeed be instructive as well as a stern corrective to their apparently naive but at bottom maliciously divisive and destructive class-war mentality.
J - I see that this is your soapbox, something you bring up in any conversation regardless of whether it's the topic or not.
This belies a deep insecurity in your position (having to constantly yell about it means that you are probably not as willing to think about it as you think you are). Or maybe you don't really believe it, so you want to incite others to help you reason your way to a different position?
Last I checked, you seemed to have skipped off of the actual post where we were talking about this.
It's easy to keep starting over and firing off your initial-blow sentiments, but then back away whenever things keep moving and get somewhat 'deep,' (I hate that word in this context, jsyk).
W.B.—
Please understand that I was referring only to hypocritical judgements—those that seek to tear down, or define "other" for the purpose of persecution/division. I believe that this was Matthew's intent.
This is distinct from admonish of one's brother for the purpose of correcting the behavior of someone who is fundamentally seen as "one of us," not "one of them."
Oh, and J - life has always been real shitty and full of pain. This isn't a 20th century problem, it's a fact of life - one that belief in the Christian God (which universalized the idea of free will, individual rights, and freedom of inquiry) has helped alleviate to a small degree. (See: democracy, hospitals, charity, the electric car).
I think everyone should judge everyone else, all the time. The text says, judge not, lest ye be judged.
I think we have to be willing to do that. Jesus himself did judge. He knocked over the money-changers' table, for example.
He judged people all the time. He was often merciful (the adulteress), but he did say to her, Go and sin NO MORE. So he wasn't just letting go of all standards and norms, which is what most want us to do.
In addition to those who spread germs and viruses, I also judge:
1. Smokers (bad) (this includes our president).
2. People who overeat (bad).
3. People who can't spell (bad).
4. People who have no set of moral standards (bad)
5. People who are nice to children, and care for them (good)
6. People who work hard and do as much as they can for their families and neighborhoods (good)
7. People who argue honestly and without too much vituperation and who can learn (good)
8. People who are smokers but are really trying hard to quit (good)
9. People who are overweight but are doing all they can to get their weight down (good)
10. People who believe in goodness, and think that it is possible (good)
11. People who think God should have given us no free will so that we are just robots following out the commands and dictates of His will (iffy).
Now for more complex judgements: someone who smokes but is careful not to let children smell the smoke, and who is also a good, say, historian.
That adds up in a positive way, largely.
People have whole long lists of traits: hundreds and hundreds.
I think all Christ's parables are meant to make us judge. Certainly he's asking us to judge the Good Samaritan not on an ad hominem basis but on what he actually does.
He's also asking us to judge the dude hanging to one side of him for having believed.
There are lots of positive judgements in the Bible.
One way in which J. is demented (there are many) is that he doesn't even listen to Fox but he judges it. Stu will also not listen to an entire program of Fox, or several episodes, but he still judges them harshly and negatively.
And yet he turns around and asks us not to judge.
But he judges!
I find this curious.
I think that if you watch Fox for a couple of days, especially Beck, and don't find yourself giggling at first, and then getting into the spirit of it, then you are probably goofy.
not that I'm judging!
J. goes so far as to judge GOD!
J.'s been around before. He's a broken record about the tsunami and other stuff.
But now we're starting to get new insights: Jewboy was one, and Mormon was another. I don't know what he's got against Ottoman Turks.
Maoism really does authentically stink.
I suppose that there are true believers in communism who always think that the long list of negative attributes to communism do not for whatever reason apply to them. Stu thinks this is ok.
I think that if they can't put two and two together, then they aren't very good academics.
Lockean liberalism is the ticket!
Add a dash of Smith and dash of Hayek, and you have a pretty good omelette, Hamlet!
Nope Brettski. Just an update of...ye olde Evidential Problem of Evil. You make claims about massive tyranny, and genocide, yet uphold religious orthodoxy--ergo, you suggest your Orthodox JHVH-on-high sanctioned it (yes, a bit trite, but a point most fundies don't quite get, never having quite got the cliffsnotes to Candide)
The B-book of Commie-ism has been available for, what, 40 years? While relevant, not exactly new news (and some questions about accuracy). Maybe check out some Winnie Churchill's comments on gassing the third world, or his praise of fascists in the 30s, his support of eugenics (Kirby has quoted Churchill on a few occasions)
Brett:
I'd like to see you document your claims about my interjecting the Courtois work in out-of-context places, but, as usual, you're as yet too lazy a reader and writer to do so (and just when I thought you'd made several good points in that mammoth-size post commentary a few days ago).
But tu quoque, homo stulte, for your bland stammering complacencies like "Oh, and J - life has always been real shitty and full of pain," e.g., are quite off point in addition to being inane ("electric cars," indeed!--'cept, of course, when you crank up your self-righteous foghorning [often quite out of context] 'bout racism and slavery--you might sample real historians of ancient slavery like Frank Snowden and of American slavery like Eugene Genovese for something new and intelligent on these subjects, OK?).
At any rate, readers of this blogsite may compare my earlier post with your two following to decide which author is the more informative and contributary to Kirby's initial posting.
Locke, a rationalist ("faith must be subject to Reason's court," etc), would have agreed with the people who arrested and censured Joseph Smith . And I doubt Locke, fairly moderate, would (playing your own silly "what if" game) even be down with the contemporary neo-con, corporate GOP, or fundamentalists. He opposed the powerful aristocrats of his day.
You don't know my views. Merely make up BS.
Logic error again, Jacques the clown. "Tu quoque" is merely a type of ad hominem. Stick to like the updates of Racine.
Now, your asking for proof of PhDs in literary etiquette before one dare criticize holy Fox, Beck, the GOP, or LDS: appeal to authori-tay, which is to say, Wrong.
Holy Golden Plates of Moroni, Batman
Kirby:
Just a second to your remark on the witless "J" (I've altogether left off directly addressing this repetitive moron) who just said that "The B-book of Commie-ism has been available for, what, 40 years?" while earlier I gave its publication date as 1997. Sorry, Kirby, that your blogsite's got a new village idiot who not only can't think, read, or write, buit can't even manage simple sums. . . .
JADL: What are you talking about?
I think you think you are J.
You are not J. You are Jacques, or James, or JADL.
I am sure everything I said was quite off-topic, because I wasn't referring to you.
With this in mind, reread the posts you had problems with, and tell me if you still have disagreement.
Generally speaking, J seemed to be saying something akin to: "perhaps belief in God was tenable in the past, but with the grotesque evil of the 20th century, it's now foolish and stupid."
My rejoinder was that things have always been bad - because people have always been bad. I mean, read the OT! Death and plague everywhere!!!
But that things are a tad better in places where the Christian ideals of individual freedom and charity and self-evident 'equality' (the word's been coopted by secularists, but I am using it kinda the way TJ did) have taken root...
And J continues to judge God, or want to judge God, from human standards, and in doing so doesn't realize that the !!all-powerful!! epoe should have no bearing on ones belief in God one way or the other. (If it does, ones beliefs are essentially baseless or basically misguided).
Innocent mistake on your part, JADL, especially since you and I usually disagree.
But with J around, we're all in agreement somehow!
I was a bit sad that you seemed to be on vacay when I had that big ol' pro-military screed a few months ago:-(.
JADL,
I believe Brett was referring to J of the contingencies blog.
Having said that, I agree with what Brett said.
Read Job, J. Even if God has some bad stuff happen, it's for God's own purpose -- which is, by definition, good.
Anyway, you keep blaming God for stuff people did, which is boring.
Just pray. Pray that the blocks before your faith be lifted.
Stu,
Dude, really?
People wear Chairman Mao shirts. In public. No one bats an eye.
Can you do this with a Hitler shirt?
Until Stalin and Mao (and Castro and Guevara) are as reviled as Hitler we need constant reminders of their cruelty and brutality -- and the inherent cruelty and brutality of Marxist-Leninism/Stalinism/Maoism.
We're going to chat with yr pastor, Kirbystein, lover of the Knesset.
Even have you banned from your own church. Temple time, and change your name, Olsenberg.
And your pal "DeLater" --sounds like a chester to some of us, which is to say...pimp.
Hey Jackie Pimp: got something to hide, tough guy?
Anyway, you keep blaming God for stuff people did, which is boring.
you don't understand the problem calvinist pendejo. Anyway your anti-rationalism is boring. Sort of like Job is boring. And your belle-lettres hustle--boring. Your flag-waving idiocies are boring.
There you go again J!!!
"flag-waving idiocies"
GM does not wave the flag.
He's a monarchist! He thinks that the American revolution was Satanic!!!
I totally disagree with him wrt politics, but calling him a flag-waving idiot is like calling Wendy a cat-hater.
Stu will also not listen to an entire program of Fox, or several episodes, but he still judges them harshly and negatively.
And yet he turns around and asks us not to judge.
But he judges!
On the contrary, I'm often forced by circumstances to see Fox. I've seen how, when a politician is caught in some gross misconduct, they always claim that the politician is Democratic, even when they're Republican. I've seen and heard enough lies from them, repeated long after they've been refuted, to know that they're simply the propaganda arm of the Ailes wing of the Republican party. This is a judgment, not a condemnation per se.
Naturally, if the propaganda arm of any entity finds out something true and damaging about its opponents, they will push it early and hard, and there is no denying that Fox does this, and that Kirby loves them for it. But it is also true (although Kirby does deny it) that they feel no particular need to constrain themselves to facts. They'll repeat "some people think X", where X is some piece of BS, over and over again, even when they know X to be false.
I suppose that there are true believers in communism who always think that the long list of negative attributes to communism do not for whatever reason apply to them. Stu thinks this is ok.
No, this is not what I said. Go back an read what I actually wrote.
J - to repeat, the EPOE proposes that you have an understanding that goes beyond a level of understanding one could Possibly have about the nature of a Creator. It requires the perspective of a being at the same level of God, which is impossible if God is God.
If you require that level of understanding to believe in something(whether with regards to the EPOE or tiddly-winks), you have already reached a point where belief is impossible.
Which is fine. Just realize that it comes Before you talk about the EPOE, not after.
Which means that the EPOE is a limp noodle.
make sense?
Belief in God takes faith, J - no one here will deny this.
If your faith has claims within the realm of reason, and those claims are demonstrably false (say, that the earth is 6,000) then it is proper and necessary to alter that aspect of ones faith.
But when faith-claims are Necessarily and By-Definition Outside of or Beyond the realm of human rationality and reason, well then one decides Before approaching evidence and arguments whether or not one believes.
If you have no faith in faith, that's fine - it's just not valid to have no faith in faith because a being that is by definition outside of a box does not fit into that box.
(and in the previous post, 'requires' would be better in the place of 'proposes')
Hey, Brett -- you're doing me a world of good. We disagree on what, everything? You probably even prefer Taylors to Gibsons -- but we're spot on on faith.
w00t.
Or worse -- you prefer solid state over tubes.
shudder.
Oh, and what is EPOE -- I must have missed that.
GM—
Stu,
Dude, really?
People wear Chairman Mao shirts. In public. No one bats an eye.
They're not nearly as common as Marley or Che T's, and the great majority of the people who wear any of them are expressing a generalized anti-establishment attitude, rather than advocating communism per se. Do I run into real, honest to goodness, Communists? On occasion. You can still buy Workers' Vanguard if you're into Trotskyite Communism. Just like Fox, they're a clock that's right twice a day. [Actually, I think Beck is experimenting with "you're right four times a day if you run the damn thing backwards."]
BTW, Leon Depre's personal copy of Rules for Radicals, imprinted by the author, is for sale at O'Gara's. Should I buy it? I think it would make Kirby happy—at least that way I'd own one of the books he thinks that leftists know by heart. Heck, I might even read it.
Can you do this with a Hitler shirt?
Sadly, yes, except for the "not batting an eye" part. But the white T and crew cut thing, sometimes with swastikas. I do see that. But the numbers aren't large relative to the population. Kind of like outright communists.
EPOE - That's the Evidential Problem of Evil, J's favorite horse that he likes to ride even when he's in a swimming pool.
You can't Wear Hitler, really, but you can hold signs that make Bush or Obama look like Hitler, and you can definitely make fun of Hitler in the movies and on the TV (if you're Jewish, at least...See Seinfeld's "Our stocks will rise HIGH!" and of course The Producers).
Kirby's Sturmabteilung-lite.
Ja mein Haaar. That's what's great about protestantism--freed from the limits of Reason, the calvinist or Lutheran more or less justifies anything, since he's a member of the Elect, supposedly.
Reichmarshall Kirbler
Stu, in general I don't think of you as one of those types (Alinsky).
You are in that group by default by virtue of being in a major university and the ELCA. Ideology is like water.
But I think you still have a good heart, and can be changed into a Fox-den goofup over time.
Heil Haar Kirby--
Reichmarshall of the Hallmark Card.
Jah-voll!
But the white T and crew cut thing, sometimes with swastikas.
I live in the South and have only seen swastika tats in exceedingly poor rural areas. And these have been rare and drawn looks askance.
Certainly they would not be allowed in schools. Do you think a kid could get away with a swastika or a Hitler shirt in public school or on a university campus?
They can with Guevara and Mao shirts.
GM—
Certainly they would not be allowed in schools. Do you think a kid could get away with a swastika or a Hitler shirt in public school or on a university campus?
They did when I was in High School. Admittedly, more than a few years ago. These days, there tend to be rules in High Schools against this kind of stuff (hence the white T's). Often, there are rules against Marley, et. al., too. Certainly there were both at the HS my son went to.
On a University campus? Just Google "college site:stormfront.org." 'Tis a mixed back of posts from the Brown Pants, but clearly they're around, whether they're wearing Hitler T's or not.
But let's be clear here. For the 18-22 crowd, fashion matters. Hitler's just not hip. And the kids wearing black are generally Goth, not a crowd the stormfront guys want to be confused with. Whereas the Che shirts come in these really gnarly colors, and tend either to piss off the old folks, or to have been borrowed from them, depending on one's choice of old folks. Either way, it's good.
And then, there's a splinter group in the gay community that's really into mocking Nazi regalia. And Kirby can't find anything good to say about them :-).
Brett:
Just back to the keyboard, and you're right of course--I made an innocent mistake in misreading "J" for "JA"--my apologies, old chap--I owe you a brew for that.
Kirby:
Stu's irrational and yet affected animus against Fox News is a mere echo of the current lib-left-Demo talking points demonising Fox News, and thus can easily be discounted (e.g., how can he justify and document such a doltish calumny as, "I've seen how, when a politician is caught in some gross misconduct, they always [!] claim that the politician is Democratic, even when they're Republican" [?!!]). What a crock! Fox has many regular lib commentators, but, as I've said before, some ask "inconvenient" or uncomfortable questions of politicians--even the Great Golfer and Caviar-Dinner Nibbler hisself (while our troops overrseas die for support), unlike the snake-dancing, fist-bumping Obama bootlickers of the alphabet soup networks. Propaganda, my *ss, Kurtz! That's "Bumbles" Gibbs' office. . . .
Either way, it's good.
Yeah, this is the problem. Mao and Che and Stalin should be curse words.
But they aren't.
Kirby:
Hitler detritus is quite hot in certain Muslim countries where they televise dramatic presentations of the "Protocols" (e.g., Egypt) and smilingly hawk copies of "Mein Kampf.' And scum like Ah-MAD-dinejad are among their biggest cheerleaders. . . .
Oo Jacques Macquerooo: suck up to zeee yankeee comma correctors!
Hey Palmer: dangerous moves from one in the teaching biz--especially comma correcting and Hallmarking. Flashin' a swazi or confederate flag gonna cost ya
On Fox, Mark Sanford "(D)" holds press conference
Liar.
ONE case, stu. I repeat: Justify the statement I quoted from your word-hoard, or count yourself the liar.
GM—
>> Either way, it's good.
> Yeah, this is the problem. Mao and Che and Stalin
> should be curse words.
Yeah, but I was referring to the parents, not to your three. And actually, Che doesn't quite fit with the other two. Not that I'm an apologist for Che, but if you believe in gradations of evil, he doesn't come close to the other two.
And even Mao, I think, started out as a nationalist. He ended up as a monster, though, and I don't think there's any doubt about that. Whereas, Stalin (like Hitler) was a monster from early on.
J - to repeat, the EPOE proposes that you have an understanding that goes beyond a level of understanding one could Possibly have about the nature of a Creator. It requires the perspective of a being at the same level of God, which is impossible if God is God.
That's even more stupid than Jacque Dee's usual anti-rationalist belch. And indeed, like most of Jacques the Pimp's rants a type of petitio principii: you have already accepted the G*d exists, when the EPOE does not. The argument proceeds inductively: given tremendous unmerited suffering and gratuitous pain, a just omnipotent JHVH-like being seems unlikely. Dee-eep, but maybe try the Wiki a few dozen times and yll get 'er.
Merry Eh-shallah-mass
JADL—
Mighty sensitive. Why are you so quick to assume that you're the referent of "liar?" For my part, I wouldn't characterize your particular style of "spirited debate," which depends on knowing presenting the truth as to misrepresent it as lying. That goes too far. I've never known you to knowingly state something false.
I was referring to the Fox commentators, of course.
JADL—
Oh, and it's not just one case. But certainly, I acknowledge, it is not every case. Do you want me to dredge up the identification that Fox presented for Mike Foley. It's a pattern, not an accident.
No Mao apologetics. He was willing to kill people to further his cause. Ergo monster.
I have already accepted that God exists.
The EPOE already accepts that God does not.
So it's a wash, you see. Something to pull one in neither directshun.
I understand the EPOE...
You just refuse to think about God in terms that would give God Godness. And you refuse to see that you are binding terms like 'holy' and 'just' to human boundaries. You can yell petitio principii all you want, but the reality of what I am arguing is that the EPOE is necessarily impactless due to its inherent petitio principii-ness. It asks of God to be less than God, and then claims that since God does not keep himself within boundaries that are not applicable to him, he probably doesn't exist.
I love when atheists try to prove that God doesn't exist.
And then yell at people of faith for trying to prove that God does exist.
Tee hee.
GM—
He was willing to kill people to further his cause. Ergo monster.
Not an uncommon failing. By this measure, every officer in any military service is a monster. I'm no fan of war, but this is too much.
Chamberlain sacrificed men to preserve the Union flank at Gettysburg. Monster?! So you say. Leonidas sacrificed men in a lost cause to defend Thermopylae, and killed many more. The very devil himself!
Admittedly, Mao's sins went beyond this, but not at the beginning. His hubris (and his abuses) grew with his power, not an uncommon fault, although carried to an uncommon degree. No question there.
Besides, who, of anyone with the slightest acquaintance with national politics wouldn't know Sanford's a Repub?
Then perhaps, like many academics, stu has a pretty contemptuous attitude towards the American voting public except as dutiful mascots and shekel-shuckers for academia--though after the last election put the present arrogant and utterly incompetent Chicago pol-hack in national office, I'm ALMOST inclined to agree. . . . But as Comte Joseph de Maistre had the odious French Revolution--the most destructive historical event of the modern world--it may be some divine chstisement for a wayward humanity. . . . Perhaps on a smaller scale, that's what we're currently enduring with Obama and his Marxist circus-performers.
Besides, who, of anyone with the slightest acquaintance with national politics wouldn't know Sanford's a Repub?
Fox news viewers.
Then perhaps, like many academics, stu has a pretty contemptuous attitude towards the American voting public except as dutiful mascots and shekel-shuckers for academia
No. Simply no.
Stu -- you said it.
GM—
I've said a lot of things. Which it do you refer to?
Typical non sequiturs and low-=level insults from typical rightist windbags and dogmatists.
I did not say I was an atheist--I say there are no arguments which could prove the existence of a monotheistic God (Kant also said as much). Nor did I say the EPOE was necessarily true: it's cogent, however: unless you think JHVH approves of Maos and Hitlers, and won't do anything about 'em (even though by definition He could). You simply don't, or kan't deal with the substance of the argument.
Well, stu knows best what his intended reference in the "liar" charge was, and I'll accept that, but his statement about Fox News I quoted was pretty indefensible. Even though stu's comments are usually more nuanced, I thought this one uncharacteristically outre. But we all cut loose a bit on politics, myself included. . . .
Mao was a doctrinaire revolutionary from the beginning of his "Long March." But it takes time to overcome the resistance of fence-sitters and reluctant potential recruits who might have thrown in with the Nationalists, and Mao knew how and when to play his true cruel hand.
Well, stu knows best what his intended reference in the "liar" charge was, and I'll accept that, but his statement about Fox News I quoted was pretty indefensible. Even though stu's comments are usually more nuanced, I thought this one uncharacteristically outre. But we all cut loose a bit on politics, myself included. . . .
Indeed. Any my use of "always" in "I've seen how, when a politician is caught in some gross misconduct, they always claim that the politician is Democratic, even when they're Republican" is too strong. "Often" would have been more accurate. I accept the correction.
They even threw Ted Stevens under the "D" bus, although in retrospect there seems to have been no small amount of prosecutorial misconduct in that case. [By Bush appointees, IIRC—just in case anyone thinks that party is the only driver of men acting badly.]
Mao was a doctrinaire revolutionary from the beginning of his "Long March." But it takes time to overcome the resistance of fence-sitters and reluctant potential recruits who might have thrown in with the Nationalists, and Mao knew how and when to play his true cruel hand.
It's hard to know, but I don't necessarily disagree. It's not as though either the Kuomintang or the Japanese Army in China were on the side of Angels, either. Sometimes, your choice boils down to "least bad." China in the 30's and 40's seems to have been such a place.
Stu,
how about this rewrite:
As He died to make men holy
let us kill to make men free
while God is marching on!
J
1) God doesn't "save us" from Mao or Hitler because it's our job in the first place.
2) God doesn't "save us" from everything bad because what would the point of free will and creation be? I mean watch Finding Nemo for Chrissake -- "not much fun for little Harpo."
3) I'm dealing fine with the substance of the argument. It's you who are projecting.
GM—
Stu,
how about this rewrite:
As He died to make men holy
let us kill to make men free
while God is marching on!
Nice. But it doesn't fly.
The soldiers in the Union Army expected to die (hence, the original), but they expected to die in combat against the slave holders (or their proxies), and in the end to prevail. It goes without saying that they expected to take a few Lagree's to the grave with them. It was a tradeoff they were willing to make.
Their willingness to die was a symbol of their devotion and steadfastness to a cause. "I will lay down my life," etc.
You know my thoughts on this. The "Battle Hymn" is a marvelous piece of propaganda in its own right, and its willful confusing of Christianity with the Union cause was particularly artful and dangerous.
Yet, I think, your attitude (only bad men would serve) is problematic too. Who was the first person in Mark to confess that Jesus was God's son? Hint: it wasn't Peter.
And once again, I should think an error of omission a subtler and more persuasive technique for committed parti pris network broadcasters (i.e., clearly party-labelling YOUR offenders while omitting or burying party labelling for OURS--and I've witnessed this countless times on the major news media stations (i.e., lib-Demo) and presses.
Of course my attitude is that only bad men would serve.
We are all evil.
To pretend otherwise is hubris.
To pretend otherwise while wrapped in sacrifice and glory is blasphemy.
We are filth and dirt, not saviors.
Also it flies fine. They expected to kill. Read the period journals.
Of course my attitude is that only bad men would serve.
We are all evil.
Fair enough, although I think it is better to say that we're all sinners rather than that we're all evil (NB, credit this thought to my wife.). But then, your beef with Mao seems diluted. Getting back to the whole "judging" meme that I started...
I think it is reasonable to make some distinctions. Many people (I'd like to say most, but lack the evidence) want to do good, and to the extent that humans are capable of it, do good. That this falls short of what God intends for us is given, acknowledged, and affirmed. But there are also many who don't want to do good, or perhaps more precisely, see their own advantage as the only good.
I think it is fair to say that "late Mao" fell into the second category, and I lack the knowledge to make a judgment w.r.t. "early Mao." I think that Stalin, early and late, fell into the second category. I think that you, and I, and the other regulars on this blog, aspire to the first category.
The question for you then regards participants in the military. I believe that many (indeed, in all probability, most) fall into the first category. They want to do good, and they define "good" in terms that you and I would assent to. You seem inclined to either deny the soft dichotomy I suggest, or to want to classify them in the second. I don't think either will do.
And much the same analysis holds w.r.t. Kirby and homosexuality. I think that homosexuality is consistent with class 1, while acknowledging that there are homosexuals (and heteros) who place their own sexual gratification as the greatest good, and so fall into class 2. Kirby seems to think that all homosexual behavior is class 2, and it often seems that you see it the same way.
Is this at all helpful?
And once again, I should think an error of omission a subtler and more persuasive technique for committed parti pris network broadcasters (i.e., clearly party-labelling YOUR offenders while omitting or burying party labelling for OURS--and I've witnessed this countless times on the major news media stations (i.e., lib-Demo) and presses.
You mean, like Fox did with Larry "wide-stance" Craig? Perhaps out of a desire to refute my "always" in fact, if not in spirit :-).
GM—
Also it flies fine. They expected to kill. Read the period journals.
Please re-read my comment. Doesn't "taking a few Lagree's to the grave with them" imply that? But the point of the song wasn't to call for murder, it was to call for resolution, and (if necessary) self-sacrifice.
"I say there are no arguments which could prove the existence of a monotheistic God"
I agree with this.
Kirby:
(I'll address stu indirectly, so as not to compromise his own vow not to address me directly)
If, (as stu's mentioned in previous posts) Craig, Foley, Stephens, Vitter, et alii on the Repub side are guilty of personally rascally behaviour, then former Prez Clinton, former Sen Ed Kennedy (not to mention his late brothers), Congressmen Patrick Kennedy, Charlie Wrangel and Barney Frank (just to kick over the starter) must, according to such an austere scale of morality, be truly monstrous by comparison. Perhaps it's best not to look too closely into the personal foibles of one's political opponents, yo?
btw, it's Simon "Legree" in H B Stowe's novel "Uncle Tom's Cabin,"--a wonderful piece of anti-slavery propaganda perhaps worthy, in stu's estimation at least, of Fox News, since Stowe spent practically zip time in a slave state during her entire life.
Stu --
The point of the song was to encourage men to kill each other.
So yes, it was calling for murder.
There's no division save for the salvation given by God through Jesus. Having said that, Mao et al should not be venerated -- as they are.
JADL—
My attitude towards politicians generally is that you can't get ahead in that game without having the ability to convince people to do things for you that are not in their best interests. It can hardly be surprising when someone who has this ability uses it to obtain sex, money, etc.
When it comes to despicable behavior, I don't think that any party holds a monopoly. That was hardly my point, as you know. Indeed, it seems to me that power corrupts, which is just a way of saying that the exercise of power over time seems to wear down the distinction between the public good and the private good, and with it the means permissible to achieve each. The recent run of bad behavior by R's is a consequence of the power they held, and which corrupted them, and will in time be followed by a run of bad behavior by D's, but we're not there yet, hence the rather dated feel to your list of miscreants on the D side, as contrasted with the freshness of your R list.
My point is and was that Fox, in a systematic and intentional way, tries to deflect responsibility for bad behavior by Republicans away from the Republican party, and when possible onto the Democratic party. Such behavior is merely one indication that Fox is a propaganda outfit, which not only reports the news, and interprets it according to its particular agenda, but will actually "create" news in the furtherance of that agenda. In doing so, it distinguishes itself (in a bad way) from actual journalism.
Correction on the spelling of Legree noted. I agree that UTC was another fine (and effective) work of propaganda, but I would hope that you'd acknowledge that the treatment of slaves in this country was a great evil. Indeed, the framers knew this, and expected (or at least hoped) that the practice would die out (especially once the importation of slaves was outlawed). Unfortunately, it proved not to be so, and I think the later the practice was eliminated, the more convulsive that elimination was going to be.
Re: treatment -- depended on where you were -- unless you view bondage in general as a great evil, in which case I think you need to talk to some usurous companies. . .
And "power corrupts" is inaccurate. Were it true, God would be corrupted -- something J would like but the rest of us know to be incorrect.
The true phrase is "power without responsibility corrupts." Hence the corruption run rampant in Democracies.
And "power corrupts" is inaccurate. Were it true, God would be corrupted -- something J would like but the rest of us know to be incorrect.
Pretty silly. You corrupt men by offering them something you have, they don't, and they want. With what could we possibly corrupt God?
The true phrase is "power without responsibility corrupts." Hence the corruption run rampant in Democracies.
You say this as if it is a distinguishing characteristic of Democracies. You know better! Hence, your tirades on Mao, Stalin, etc. You might as well be talking Nero and Tiberias. And I don't think that Mr. Clinton discovered any sins that Henry VIII hadn't explored long before.
No, what distinguishes Democracies isn't the behavior of its leaders, but the relatively painless way that we have of exchanging them for others.
Mao and Stalin are the end result of Democratic movements. As are Nero and Tiberius for that matter.
I don't understand anything about homosexuals, and don't make clear classings of them as a group.
I have a lot of homosexual friends. But they're all poets.
The category of "good poet" trumps everything else for me.
It's actually the only thing I care about much. One of my real beefs with communism is the ways in which it hasn't been good for poetry.
Marxism in general is very hard on poets.
Disease is hard on poets.
GM—
Mao and Stalin are the end result of Democratic movements. As are Nero and Tiberius for that matter.
Utterly laughable. Julius Caesar usurped power from a republican government, and was a military dictator, pure and simple, the first in a long line. You might as well attribute the sins of our democracy to the English monarchy from our fore-bearers rebelled.
Neither the Bolsheviks nor the Communist Party of China ever believed in democracy as anything more than a theoretical commitment.
Kirby—
I have a lot of homosexual friends. But they're all poets.
The category of "good poet" trumps everything else for me.
It's actually the only thing I care about much. One of my real beefs with communism is the ways in which it hasn't been good for poetry.
I think you want to be careful here. For one thing, bad times can make for good poetry, cf. Lamentations, or (apropos communists) Pasternak, Nabokov, Solzhenitsyn. It gives them something to push against. Yevtushenko was a more ambiguous figure, but Babi Yar is poetry for the ages, as Shostakovich recognized at great personal risk. You really have to hear it (whether you understand it or not) in Russian to grasp its power.
I suspect that AIDS has had a bigger impact on poetry than Lyme. Whether or not in proportion to the disparity in funding is a more difficult question.
There aren't any veryclear rules wrt sexuality in these times. But if we go back to the Book, (a book that even Stu seems to recognize as authoritative), we have Romans, wehave Leviticus, and other places, where it seems that there is a strong stricture against homosexuality.
Stu's branch of Lutheranism has reduced the bible to the Sermon ont he Mount, and even further yet, to the Beatles tune, "Love is all you need." but in the realm of law, in which we actually live, we need some rules or guidelines.
I am at this point willing to let the law determine what's what in the legal realm, and the theologians determine what's what in the theological realm.
The problem with the ELCA is that laity decide everything.
I'd rather have clear recognized authorities decide.
Obama in his book says he's against gay marriage.
It's a very ticklish area, and hard to understand any aspect of it.
Everything is marshy, unless you go back to a few clear sentences in the Book.
Around and around we go, and where we will stop, nobody knows.
J. has still not given us his thinking on this topic.
But then reason can't found values. It can only articulate them. Feeling determines values, and faith determines feelings.
Stu--
You're showing a (willful?) ignorance of history.
Julius Caesar (not an emperor and in fact, the reality of the coming Imperium cannot be assumed from his actions) usurped no such power. He was voted dictator for life and turned away the crown.
Moreover, Octavius acquired all of his majestic offices and titles through the SPQR. The trappings of the Republic never died -- so much so that Octavian (as Augustus) was able to claim he had saved the Republic.
And Bolshevism and Maoism were simply democracy with weapons -- much like the French Revolution and our own Revolution.
Well, "power corrupts" (if one considers the source)--strictly speaking, IS inaccurate, for Lord Acton's original quotation prefaced the corruption reference with "TENDS to corrupt" (emphasis mine).
And the private sexual peccadilloes that plague politicians of both parties indifferently (I'll agree with stu here) were not so much my concern as the ongoing political and financial corruption of those officials RECENTLY implicated, say, in the origins of the financial crisis, namely Dodd, Wrangel, Kerry, Obama, Schumer, Frank (darlings of FannieMae/FreddieMac/Countrywide), et alii, in addition to the crass venality and gangsterism of ex-rep Jefferson, ex-mayors Kilpatrick and Berry et alii, added to those politicians protecting the corrupt ideologues (with dirty hands) at the utterly corrupt ACORN and the SEIU, in addition to ongoing political sinkhole that is Blago's Chicago (stu's touching belief that Mayor Richard Daley is a "clean" politician is hardly worth a "ho-ho-ho!"). The "old news" ploy simply won't wash.
And that Fox News interviewers dare to ask "inconvenient" questions of politicians ignored by the openly biased news appendages of other networks (like the despicable ABC hack Charlie Gibson, whose interview machete-job on Sarah Palin alone earned him journalistic infamy) seems especially galling to some. . . .
A quibble: Pasternak, Nabokov, and Solzhenitsyn were not primarily poets but writers (and the first two translators as well); perhaps Ahkmatova or Brodsky might have served to illustrate stu's point, though the numbers of poets and artists like Mandelstam (Akhmatova's lover) who perished in Stalin's death camps is inculculable. Gave a macabre twist to Foucault's later post-human claptrap about "the death of the author."
"incalculable"
Love as a response to all other questions, and especially as something that trumps the Law, was already brought forward in the Scarlet Letter.
The argument in the book is that love must come out.
It's almost now a new religion of its own, using the Sermon on the Mount as its ultimate source of authority.
But then there are different kinds of love, as someone on this thread has pointed out. Agape, Eros, and what are the others.
The term can easily be juggled, and used in a magical kind of way, in order to legitimate all kinds of stuff.
McJacques with the Lord Acton re-run, and the usual Foxter defamation of the demon-crats.
The Gramm/Gingrich/GOP Congress arranged the lending crisis in 90s --with help from Bill Clinton. De-reg, and privatization gave the AIG/G-Sachs/J-Morgan financial barons the freedom they needed to lend to anyone, and to speculate with securities (ie, mortgage funds) . The Glass-Steagall act--in place since New Deal-- was dismantled. (and F-mac was a Nixon plan). Bush/GOP congress ruled from 2000-4, and they did little about the lending situation--anyway it was a war-time bullish economy, with record profits in crude oil, for the contractors, and for lenders. The pelosicrats, hardly superior to the neo-cons, did not act, but they did not have the power until 2006.
So, McJacques is full of merde as per usual.
And putting Countrywide together with Dems. Heh heh. The GOP/ Reagan's mafia pals put together Countrywide as a tax scam . Run by developers,junk bond kings, securities fraud and bunko guys. Cheney stops by their office in El Lay when out west--or he did until they were bought out by B of A. You don't know jack about econ. either.
Maybe finish that Econ. and American History 101 course, along with the ebonics Nabakov-for-Xtians, Jacques
I'm pretty sure the Cold War ended about twenty years ago. Don't see much point in trying to kick field goals with an amputated limb.
GM—
Just to review the bidding. In your effort to avoid the question regarding the moral status of serving officers, you're now reduced to arguing that the oligarchic Roman Senate's vote to hand over its hereditary power to one man in the coercive presence of his newly victorious legions was somehow an expression of democracy; and that Caesar's decision to take on the role but not the title of emperor is somehow Washingtonian. All of this to maintain a position that Tiberias and Nero—emperors in name and well as role—are somehow outgrowths of democratic movements.
FWIW, I think that Senate's reaction to Brutus's March 15 motion to reconsider was far more reflective of their real opinion on Caesar's usurpation, not that the Roman Senate was the least bit democratic (they'd have viewed such a claim as an insult).
JADL—
Do you actually have something on Obama, or just the usual "some people think" BS?
I concur with J here—the financial crisis was a consequence of deregulation, much more than "affordability," and that deregulation was lead by Republicans, along with a few bought-and-paid-for Democratic enablers. Consider this: those "affordable" loans that Fox and friends like to beat uup on had been in service for a decade or more when the financial crisis hit. Their assessment base was pre-bubble, and the owners had significant equity by that point. These are not the loans that default.
Also, regarding Pasternak, Nabokov, and Solzhenitsyn. Is Robert Graves primarily an author of poetry or prose? To look at the bookstores today, you'd have to conclude prose. I've had a hard time finding Graves' poetry in print. But he certainly thought of himself as a poet first and foremost. History has distorted our view of all of these. I knew about Akhmatova, but didn't she stick to love poetry? Such would not have made my point, such as it was, that bad times can inspire lasting poetry.
It's not an effort to question the moral standing of serving officers.
But yes. These were outgrowths of distributed power sharing i.e. democracy, which always dilutes the vote and uses the voices of the people (the mob rule beginning with the Gracchi brothers is what led to both Caesars being able to take power) to bring about power -- and democracy always ends up, in its last sclerotic throes, with a dictator supported by a mob.
democracy always ends up, in its last sclerotic throes, with a dictator supported by a mob.
Well stated comrade! Right out of Plato's Republic (not the Gospels--which are somewhat democratic in places, as Locke realized).
JADL—
Just a quick note. I asked a Russian colleague about Pasternak, Nabokov, and Solzhenitsyn. He said the latter two are known (even in Russia) primarily as prose authors. But Pasternak is first and foremost a poet. Indeed, he said that he didn't think much of Zhivago, "although the topic is important," except for the poetry at the end, which was excellent.
I raised the comparison with Graves, and responded with Robert Penn Warren, who saw himself as a poet first, but is best known for "All the King's Men." My colleagues take on this is that the title "poet" is not something that and individual can bestow on themselves, but something they have earn from others.
Sorry the internet ate my former response to stu's note.
I haven't much Russian, so of course I'll defer to stu's Russian colleague's judgement, though I'll try to consult with my Russian-lit acquaintance Gary Saul Morson of Northwestern U on the matter--it's just that I remember him most for his novel "Doctor Zhivago" and his Shakespeare translations.
On the gifted and enigmatic Robert Graves, I've read some of his WWI poetry (I made a special study of WWI poets while a soldier in Vietnam), though I remember him mostly for his war memoirs, "Goodbye to All That," his Roman novel "I, Claudius," his two books on the Greek myths, and his translations, including his Penguin Lucan.
Pleased to find that stu has found a sterling ally in "J." That makes it all easier, to be sure. . . .
McJacques defending some chi-chi vichy hack like Nabakov: how predictable. The Scooter Libby of Kirbyland--and ESL Nabakov. Whoa.
(so much for the New Testament, eh, Mr.Stu)
JADL—
Pleased to find that stu has found a sterling ally in "J." That makes it all easier, to be sure. . . .
Actually, I think that J fits well into our cast of characters, in that he doesn't align precisely with any of us. Certainly, I'm clearly Christian in my commitments, whereas J is undecided. But in any fight between Protestants and Catholics, you're likely to find him on your side. OTOH, clearly his politics tend to the left. So in some ways, he seems more like JH than like me in terms of his commitments, which I'll grant has a high level of irony to it.
In terms of his methods, it seems to matter a lot who he is talking to. I've found him perfectly pleasant so far in his dialog with me, even though there is a fair bit we disagree on.
J—
I'm not sure I see JADL defending Nabokov. I raised Nabokov as a possible counter-example to Kirby's contention that Marxism is bad for poetry. JADL questioned whether it is reasonable to count Nabokov as a poet, and when I checked with my Russian colleague, he said, "no," agreeing with JADL, and thereby mooting Nabokov's role in the discussion. I'm left with Pasternak, and am willing to rely on my colleague for the authenticity of his standing as a poet.
(so much for the New Testament, eh, Mr.Stu)
Not sure what you're getting at here. We do bounce around some, that's for sure. I'm sure we'll get back to the New Testament in due course.
Nyet. Peruse Jadl
's comment on bad times: he suggests bad times leads to Nabakovs, Solz., etc.
I stand by my previous assertion: he's defending Vlad N. A skilled literatteur to be sure, but rightist-nihilist, and only a few steps from de Sade. And VN's remains a fave of the Steinford neo-con squad. I respect a few paragraphs of Solz. but he was arch-conservative as well.
And it was Barthes, I believe, who proclaimed the death of the author. Jadl doesn't even get the names of his villains in his paranoid phantasia right.
J—
The comment about bad times was mine, not JADL's. And this was in the attempt to produce evidence vs. Kirby's point that Communism is bad for poets.
I've read Lolita, and Nabokov was listed among notable Russian language poets. Certainly, he was into social criticism, although perhaps not always constructive social criticism. In any event, I've had to defer to both JADL and my Russian colleague on this one. If Nabokov was a notable poet, it was only in his own mind. This leaves me with Pasternak.
I certainly know that Solzhenitsyn was deeply conservative. That was painfully obvious after he moved to the US. Still, I think that the Gulag Archipelago was brilliant portrayal of a corrupt regime's use of the penal system to silence political opponents. Certainly, the Soviet system was his ticket—precisely the point I needed, but unfortunately in prose rather than poetry.
I can't understand how wanting freedom and humor is misconstrued as being conservative. It's beyond me.
Ivan Denisovitch was sentenced to seven years hard labor for having told a joke against Stalin. (He never tells us the joke!)
Still not sure what is going on here -- both S and N spent lots of time in the states.
But N. would have been a White Russian, and Solzhenitsyn from another sector of society altogether.
Do you mean that because of their exile they wrote well, Stu?
Anyone who could read or write died in Cambodia. This left oral literature, I suppose.
I'm less familiar with the lit. of Cambodia, to the extent that any exists since they murdered their entire literate population.
I guess some got out and wrote something. And in a sense that might be called good for their literature.
Most of the E. European countries bled a few poets, especially into France, and this could be called good for their literature in a strange way, I guess.
Romania's Jews did particularly well: tzara, Fondane, Codrescu, in particular come to mind. Do you mean that the punishment brought their literature to a high point?
I am missing something.
Let me fetch me spectacles--yes, but he still accepted it, approves of Count Nabakov and Solz., merely changed it to "writers" instead of poets.
Solz. at times nearly sided with the nazis. His writing may have been needed, but he wasn't even a "writer" per se--he was like an engineer, or math teacher or something. His prose tends to be nauseating. Nabakov could write a sort of clever soft-porn I suppose, but nauseates in a different way--like Liberace muzak. Did they ever read say Joe Conrad, an authentic writer? Unlikely, or they weren't paying attention.
Literature is 90% bogus anyhoo. Dash Hammett outscrawled about any lit snob, or wannabe beatnik you could name (even xtian one)
Kirby—
Do you mean that the punishment brought their literature to a high point?
In effect, yes. Poets, like all writers, need something to write about. Bad times are often interesting times, and lead to works of memorable value. Of course, if things are bad enough (cf., Cambodia under Pol Pot), then the writers don't survive. But the USSR wasn't always (or even usually) that bad. So writers did survive, and some wrote about the evil they faced, and will be remembered for it.
Kind of like WW I, and Graves, Owens, and Sassoon. Or Tolkien, who had similar experiences, but was not part of their circle, IIRC.
I suspect that other, similar clusters can be identified. Indeed, you point to Codrescu & friends.
J—
Conrad's an interesting point. I read "Heart of Darkness." How could I not? [Please understand that my surname is Kurtz.] But I also read Achebe's "Things Fall Down," understanding it to be to "Heart of Darkness" much as "This Land is Your Land" is to "God Bless America." My sympathies are with Guthrie in the latter case, and therefore predictably with Achebe in the former. But I grant your point: Conrad could write. That doesn't mean hes a comfortable read for me, contingencies being what they are...
Conrad produced Art--and transcended politics. He wasn't some rabid colonialist either, but genuinely concerned about the belgians' treatment of the africans. Achebe was wrong--dead wrong.
Not sure music analogy works. Conrad's like Stravinsky or something.
J—
Not sure music analogy works. Conrad's like Stravinsky or something.
Well, certainly not like Berlin.
Achebe was wrong--dead wrong.
I think it depends on how you read Achebe. Certainly, it is easy to read him as anti-Christian, and perhaps that was his intent. But that's not how I read him. I read him as chronicling how a societal disruption looks and feels like to someone who expected to be a winner, but ended up a loser. Whether such a spectacle fills you with sadness or schadenfreude depends entirely on where your sympathies lie in a particular case. Are we reading Oedipus Rex, or MacBeth?
I've only read a few sections of Things Fall Apart. Achebe certainly had a right to complain about europeans, colonialism, or academics. But he DID NOT have a right to somehow link Conrad--a writer, not politician, or adventurer-businessman---to the outrage and tyranny of colonialism, or western civ. as a whole.
It's the worst sort of PC "leftist" who usually agrees with Achebe--not even really marxist (some of whom may read Conrad for insights on colonialism). Let's also remember Conrad did not belong to the Academy, was no professor or scholar. Walked the talk as they say. HoD's real--as real as Hemingway, probably more so. Same for Lord Jim and other stories.
Achebe stepped over the line--into racism. Even in worse case scenario--Conrad was really a racist as well--ok, call him a tyrant, but still respect his vision. I read about Chas Mingus and don't care for the man, but still respect some of his muzak.
Macbeth, ah guess. (really stu, I think I have upset the Olsenator and pals, and may be exiting shortly)
J—
It's the worst sort of PC "leftist" who usually agrees with Achebe
Am I really the worst sort? I hope not. Anyway...
I'm not really down on Conrad. But I definitely take Guthrie over Berlin, and so there is a certain appeal to the corresponding party in the Achebe-Conrad parallel.
And I'm not sure I see Achebe as racist, either. Certainly, his story ended up setting the white missionaries as the bad guys, and the black native "pre-Christian" culture as the good guys. But if you think that this is enough to tar Achebe as racist, then I don't see how Conrad escapes the same charge. For my part, I think that neither are. If they'd written dozens of stories, each with the same framing, then I'd grant you a case.
I don't know who Chas Mingus is. Should I?
I think I have upset the Olsenator and pals, and may be exiting shortly.
I missed the "Jewboy" comment. Kirby does not tolerate ad hominem particularly well, JADL notwithstanding, although he does tolerate disagreement well. My theory is that I'll apologize if I'm in the wrong, but that does seem to be a minority position here as elsewhere. I'll leave it to you to decide what is right for you, and whether to stay or go. But there is a high degree of contention here, and not a few long-standing feuds.
You've never heard of Mingus?? Charles Mingus. Youtube him.
Conrad was a polish catholic, but reports are that he was not so orthodox as he aged. Not sure whether he took the Host or not at death.
I don't think it was strictly religious either, Stu. Achebe wanted to ID Conrad as part of euro-colonialism. Even when Conrad was in africa he was usually on a ship, like merchant seaman or something--not exactly Cecil Rhodes.
Simply in terms of "ethnicity" Achebe's thesis doesn't fly. Poles are sort of outsiders, and not WASP or nordic--many have a speck of magyar--or turk in 'em. Even politically, Conrad was not some Burke like Tory or monarchist. Maybe conservative in some sense, but Conrad did bring the tyrannies of the belgian congo to light, with great skill.
now here the exchange has become civil
charles mingus
elevated the bass viol
to a neww level of solo artistry
it's hard to appreciate what he did from the recordings although i recommend anyone you can listen to
he was sort of a proto anthony braxton
exploring a whole musicology in his approach to jazz inventing stealing forcing technique and teaching he was a griot of sorts
he played all the Bbop chops but he was doing something else
a sort of sad and typical tragic struggle with excess marked his personal life but he was great when he was on top of things he was great
some great interpretations of thelonious monk
makes me want to dig around and listen to some mingus
i'm with you stu on the assessment of achebe
and i agree with the statement that conrad was a artist extrordinaire J
every once in awhile i think i'll go back and read conrad again and i never do
lazy i guess
communism when coupled with christian compassion is something that has worked when it is a christ centered agreement between people it works....perhaps it only works as a microcosm and should not be imposed on the world of governments at large
if curtois' critique is to be taken seriously then i would think that the further question need be what did communism deem to replace
peaceful communism has only worked for humans where values and virtues are explicit in the culture
but it has worked and very well at times
i don't mean to wave the benedictine flag to goofily but
i tell people that benedictines live with both a communist and democratic bent...there is a republican aspect to what we do as well
kirbyz on a cyberoll agin
pax
j
J—
You've never heard of Mingus?? Charles Mingus. Youtube him.
Wow. Thanks! I'm glad to have that particular hole in my education filled.
Poles are sort of outsiders, and not WASP or nordic--many have a speck of magyar--or turk in 'em.
Not that I'm disagreeing, but the Poles have had their ups and downs. There was a time when they slapped the Russians around pretty hard. They're a proud people, mostly in a good way.
I'm beginning to think that you're taking the Achebe as against Conrad thing too far, as it was not my sense that Achebe was writing against the man, so much as against the story, and was trying to tell a similiar story, but from a radically different perspective. But I value, too, the perspective you bring, that there's a harder and distinctly more personal criticism here. I'll try to find time to re-read both (it won't be soon—I'm swamped right now), and test it.
JH—
communism when coupled with christian compassion is something that has worked when it is a christ centered agreement between people it works
Absolutely! But I'd like to pick a bit at J's question as to whether or not Conrad was in communion at the end. It seems to me that the Catholic Church takes a public hard line w.r.t. orthodoxy—either you're with us in all things, or you're not one of us. Of course, the reality is a good deal more complicated.
It seems to me that there's a tradeoff involved in maintaining the public face. It encourages unity (or discourages dissent, depending on one's perspective), but it probably also has a tendancy to drive the "almost orthodox" away, raising pastoral issues as J suggests might have been operational in Conrad's case. I suspect that the actual experience of someone like Conrad would depend a lot (perhaps, to an excessive degree) on the temperament of his parish priests.
I'm not arguing that the Catholic Church is wrong here, or passing any sort of judgment, just noting that I'd think it is a shame if someone ends up feeling unwelcome, out of the conversation, and with no place to turn at the end, because they're relying overly much that the Church means what it says about strict orthodoxy in all things.
peaceful communism has only worked for humans where values and virtues are explicit in the culture
but it has worked and very well at times
i don't mean to wave the benedictine flag to goofily but
i tell people that benedictines live with both a communist and democratic bent...there is a republican aspect to what we do as well
I don't think there's any surprise here. In small communities, in which the participants have a high degree of mutual trust and regard, I think that democracy and communism end up in the same place operationally as well as theoretically. The problem, though, is with scaling. Society at large does not, and seeming cannot, be constructed this way. Eventually, you have to draw the circle so large that you include people who want to exploit the system, along with sufficient anonymity that they can get away with with. In small communities, anonymity is not an option.
But I am—envious is too strong and negative a word—admiring of people who have arranged their life so as to be part of such a community.
it would be hard for me to come up with a scenario stu where someone would be unwelcome in the confessional in any catholic church
the weight of the decision is always on the individual
i don't know what the problem was with Conrad...graham greene sort wandered in and out of faith he was a church goer but fairly eratic
at best
evelyn waugh gave heavy refined nods to the church and had priest friends galore but didn't care all that much for going to mass every day or even every sunday
it would seem to me that both heart of darkness and things fall apart speak to the same sort of evil
without knowing what the scene was with conrad i couldn't say much about why he was alienated
achebe's gift to us was the honest assessment of cultural clash from the point of view of the losers...he saw something so solid so profound so sensible get dragged into the streets of carelessness and wasn't so sure that what was being projected as progress was anything close to progress
the adiaphora as understood by rome is all penitent hearts are welcome...as that get's interpreted in various cultures such as ours it takes on a more vehement and unflexible tone i would agree
but on matters like cross gender marriage or abortion or sexual deviance christians from the very start laid the line down as to what was to be permitted what was to be eschewed....and at the same time there has always been an interesting take on the fogiveness for all that sometimes it has been supragracious...other times it has been fairly sever... it appears to me now that the church's last 100 yrs with a firm critical stand against modernist presumptions is proving itself important...the cry from rome has beenn..."you cannot lose sight of moral basic moral values you cannot rage against civility you cannot presume to manage in the world what only god must manage"....yet...it is always important to address each issue with an informed conscience...
for instance right now there is this huge difficulty with the far rightist group teh levebvrites or soemthing like that anyway they have decided the VC II is a hoax and have taken their own direction...because yrs ago they deemed themsleves capable of ordaining adn installing their own bishops rome took a stand nad ordered escommunication for all adherents....they didn't seem to mind they took it as verification of their righteousness and set about doing their own thing...just this year pope benedict opened the door to open communication saying that people of these churches are in effect all welcome once again at the communion table...the group turned and about face and ordained a bishop or two without permission...the holy father hasn't responded yet...catholic chess is a littel different game when i first saw those three tiered chess boards i thought to myself yeah that's a little more like catholic chess
when a public figure takes a public stand against a position in the catholic church the church is obliged to enter into discussion about where the truth may lie (that's an odd choice of phrase i know)
at the beginning of obamas' massive takeover of washington DC in an effort to impose kenyan tribal political principles in every sphere of our lives and make republicans cringe in feer of loozing their busniess rights it's all socialism now help we're dying out here when will the cataclsym come it's over call down the rapture...o sorry got carried away there what was i saying
o yeah
bishop wuerl of DC and a number of other bishops entered into conversation with pelosi biden chris smith and a host of cathlik legislaotrs and very agreeably laid down the line and the catholic statement was there will be no challenging at the communion table over any issue but in exchange the politicos must take care to fully articulate the catholic position whether agreed with or not on all matters of moral weight in the political sphere
when pelosi was given a clear explanation of the churches doctrinal position and was informed that this is the ancient christian position nothing new she demured and suposedly nodded and with her big beautiful italian eyes blinked and said..."i did not know that"...she's not spoken a public word that'i've heard on the right to abortion since then...other catholic women have it is true but what can you do..they can still come in stiff jawed and righteous and have communion if they feel they must
i don't know if that clarifies or if i'm ramblin
just a ramblin sort of guy
a great lesson in cyberdetante goin on here i likes it a lot
paxpax
jh
Nothing "painful" about Solzhenitsyn's conservatism or his prose (same with the hyper-gifted Nabokov's anti-communism--or Brodsky's, et alii), except for weaselly communist symps, Western parlour-pinks and academic limo-libs.
And to suggest that Solzhenitsyn would have had little to write about had he not endured persecution and imprisonment in the USSR is as lame as stu's squeakily amateur grasp of Roman history in the age of Augustus, Tiberiu[!]s, Nero (to the yr of the four emperors in 68 AD), and beyond (Kirby's remarks are much more informed).
If one's read only "Lolita," one hardly knows anything of Nabokov's gifts (he himself referred to "Lolita" as an absurd little tale written mostly for money). "Pale Fire" and "Ada" are a much better measure of his brilliance in fiction, while his literary criticism and articles on translation (as well as his laboured translation of the medieval epic "The Lay of Igor's Campaign") are also well worth reading. He also thoroughly thrashed the uppity American lit-pinko Edmund Wilson on Russian language issues.
The problem with referring to Pasternak's poetry as opposed to his prose is that knowledge of Russian poetry in the original languages here is limited mostly to Slavic specialists, and poetry for the most part can only be imitated or translated into inartistic prose (however useful as cribs for those learning the language).
It's true that Barthes coined the term "death of the author," though Foucault certainly took up the point in his usual obtusely worthless way, relentlessly "historicising" the "author-function" just as he did with "humanity" itself. Trouble is, most real historians have found his work decidedly unhistorical.
What the great Conrad thought of radicals and other left-political loons is well displayed in his "The Secret Agent" (on Conrad, stu's leftist lap-pup "J" shows himself--very, very occasionally, to be sure--capable of deviating into sense, as Dryden had it).
On stu's miserably misguided lib-Demo-talking points about the housing bubble and the causes of the recession (tinkling out the dereg-rag yet again), we've been over all that before. . . . No sense talking sense to Obamaites like stu about it.
but but
"Obama's the most powerful writer since Julius Caesar!"
Conrad's one thing; Nabakov's soft-porn bric a brac another. One real, authentic and intense; the other one mostly virtuoso fluff (including the odd but boring Eliotish Pale Fire). Like Beethoven vs. Liszt. You alas side with the Lisztes, Jadlovski (or Liberaces). Ergo, yr the poodle, Jadlovksi.
Those who have read Lord Jim carefully might sense that Konrad was not exactly rooting for the home team (ie Europa)--reality's a bit too complex to be accounted for by the usual neo-con, Kissinger or Bernie Madoff schema.
from what a brief websearch has shown me KONRAD was skeptik most his life but thought it over before the end and received communion and confession before he died....many of the last shall be first...i'm banking on it
jh
J's back to his dopey orthodox ignorance in stupidly berating the great pianist, musical transcriber and composer Liszt for not being Beethoven or the consummate litterateur, linguist and lepidopterist Nabokov for not being Conrad. Moreover, "Eliotish" could describe what applies to one of the 20th c's best poets and lit critics. Tin-ear city in all cases. . . . A brick who scribbles brackish prose. . . .
Although great writers rarely adhere to a "party-line," I don't even think I'd trust a lit rube like J to parse Stalin's pamphlet on the tractor. . . .
ugh,
Lord Jim.
The most anti-poetry novel ever written.
Many thanks to JH for thinking to track down what really happened with Joseph Conrad, and then doing it. I'm glad to hear that he had the consolation of the church in his final days.
BS.
No daffodillies, or damsels-in- distress, but Conradian prose does not lack for poetic qualities. His writing concerned ideas, perceptions, images, values, codes if you will. He's not my favorite writer, and may be a bit pretentious at times, but quite superior to the usual victorian sap, or 'Merican boiler-room speak
Lord Jim: """"There are many shades in the danger of adventures and gales, and it is only now and then that there appears on the face of facts a sinister violence of intention—that indefinable something which forces it upon the mind and the heart of a man, that this complication of accidents or these elemental furies are coming at him with a purpose of malice, with a strength beyond control, with an unbridled cruelty that means to tear out of him his hope and his fear, the pain of his fatigue and his longing for rest: which means to smash, to destroy, to annihilate all he has seen, known, loved, enjoyed, or hated; all that is priceless and necessary—the sunshine, the memories, the future; which means to sweep the whole precious world utterly away from his sight by the simple and appalling act of taking his life."""
Res Ipsa Loquitur
I see JADL has rejoined the conversation, bringing with him that characteristic civility and capability for sustained rational argument for which he is justly known around these parts. I'm sure that if he keeps repeating the line often enough that Democrats bear sole responsibility for a financial crisis that occurred after years of Republican government, and where the precipitating causes are Republican values made law, someone will believe him.
There is a true artistry at work here—it is like watching Daffy Duck playing Allan Bloom playing Alonso Quijana. That it is a spectacle is given. That few would care to attempt it, even more so. But we certainly must give him credit for the effort, however labored it may seem.
And we're all grateful for his ceaseless efforts to promote correct spelling. As well all know, correct spelling is a cardinal virtue of the internet, and without the services of the self-appointed censors of accurate spelling, we'd have all gone to the dogs long ago. And clearly the overall literary level of this blog is enhanced by knowledge that Latin is essential for educated discourse, but also that Pasternak's standing as a poet can be savely disregarded because JADL himself does not know Russian.
For these insights and contributions, we are all truly grateful.
Let's see--Jadlovski's praised Nabakov, Solz., TS Eliot, Lord Acton, Foxnews, Cheney, the GOP, and Glenn Beck. The Norman Podhoretz of Kirbyland! (Even that semi-talented hack Nabakov objected to the 'Nam hawks, reportedly)
chinga tu madre, zionist-basura
"Victorian"--great age of English poetry, fiction and essays, though not drama. Great queen, too, as Oscar Wilde well tells us.
Henh, henh. I know how tetchy stu is about his spelling, so in grand deference (sweeps low his plumed hat) to his Latin-lite vocab
(language of scholars for nearly two millennia, just as French has been the language of artistic taste and elegance), I decided to give him one freebie before swingin' the ol' teacherly ferula once again--after all, we all make typos, but at least I'd wish to be corrected after the second 'stake. On the other hand, his ponderously leaden sarcasm deserves nothing but(t) a Swiftian kick out the door. Or Popean, for "Such labour'd nothings, in so strange a style,/Amaze th' unlear'd, and make the learned smile."
Didn't say the Demos were SOLELY (I should have thought stu'd be wary of such language after getting his knuckles rapped for talking nonsense like Fox News "always" misidentifies political perps to the detriment of the Demos--'sides, correction of spelling errors isn't tantamount to censorship) responsible for the recession--just mostly. Nor did I suggest that Pasternak's deserved rep for poetry (and personal courage in the face of heavy-handed communist repression); it's just that most of us in the West are unable to appreciate his poetry in the original. But that's our failing, not his. Same perhaps with Yevtushenko, (even though he turned out to be a communist party pet, like Prokofiev, who wrote some fine music nevertheless).
Who is "Nabakov"? (that's at least twice for stu's frothed-mouth Jew-baiting lap-dog)
You wouldn't say lapdog to my face, Jadlofski. You wouldn't have a face. Now, let's hear your praise of say Winnie Churchill next, Jadlovksi. Or Nixon-Kissinger. Ode to Nixonian-Napalm, by Jadlofski.
Your supposed monarchist heroes--like TS Eliot--were anti-semite, anyway, Jadl. Maybe jus' stick to Jonah Goldberg or somethin'.
after "repression)": "is unwarranted" (omission--Vide, Stuarte, non dolet--"See, Stuart, it doesn't Hurt")
after "repression)": "is unwarranted" (omission--Vide Stuarte, non dolet--"See, Stuart, it doesn't hurt")
More threats yet again from from the off-again-on-again rabid and dirty-mouthed lapdog. . . . Perhaps he'll try washing the dribbling dirty froth off his face by sticking his empty head in the toilet and flushing a few times. . . .
Ahh yeahh, Jadlovski, representin' for Foxnews school of lit-ur-a-ture. What's next-- maybe some dee-ep thoughts on Aynnie Rand's masterpieces, genius.
Existence, like, exists
More threats yet again from from the off-again-on-again rabid and dirty-mouthed lapdog.
One man's lapdog is another man's pit bull. As it happens, J is his own man, full responsible for his own positions, and evidently capable of mounting a vigorous defense.
Perhaps he'll try washing the dribbling dirty froth off his face by sticking his empty head in the toilet and flushing a few times.
J, you have to take JADL more seriously. Experience matters. If it works for him, it should work for just about anyone. If you ever get dribbling, dirty froth on your face, now you'll know what to do.
Jadl's lying anyway,and engaging in his typical prissy drama.
I never threatened anyone, and haven't made any serious anti-semitic comments. Dissing Cheney, or Fox, or neo-cons (including sheetbags like Podhoretz), or the Olsonator for defending Fox/Beck/neo cons does not reach to the level of anti-semitism.
Now, on to the Klassix of the divine Ayn Rynd! A Kirbyland sort of gal.
Yeah, the stu-fog-function's exuding its usual mustily sanctimonious vapours again, just as when some internet lunatic (who knows? another sway-dough-nonymous "J" who's too scaredy as yet to reveal himself? perhaps a steroided-out half-educated pill-popper? or some mouthy wimp? or one and the same vacuum-between-the-ears-abhorrent-to-nature? again, who knows?) a while back began threatening Kirby and his family--a threat which the stu-function intoned was "spoofing." Yeah, right. Now when I've had enough fun correcting, winding and spinning you two (since the stu-function seems so desperate for anyone resembling an ally) like tops, I'll leave off. . . . But not before, see?
Still, I've tried to throw you two an informative carrot or two along with putting a corrective stick about here and there--J's an easy mark for pushing to the point of issuing vile obscenities and physical threats, while the sanctimonious and fusty stu-function likes to gloss over such barbarities with intoned rubbish about the offending party as mere jester or supposed independent critical judge (he even finishes up another leaden attempt at sarcasm by parodying the language of a Protestant dinner benediction!), "semper caecus" to a leftist ally's "kaka."
JADL—
just as when some internet lunatic ... a while back began threatening Kirby and his family--a threat which the stu-function intoned was "spoofing."
I suggest you go back and read that post. Here's the link:
LYME'S FUNDING
The term "spoofing" refers to providing incorrect identifying information (typically as a part of an internet based communication or transaction), e.g., an email message with a forged email address, or a blog posting by one party that purports to come from another. It is a technical term in the domain of computer security, and was an accurate description the particular attack we were facing.
This particular usage is too new to be documented in the OED, but here is a reference:
NetLingo Dictionary: Spoofing
If I recall corrected, that attack consisted of forged postings (to use a synonym that is more familiar to you than "spoofed") messages purporting to come from you. The solution was to disallow "anonymous" commenting, because "anonymous" commenting allowed the commenter to pick any "name," and so was an open invitation to this particular abuse.
A most informative post from stu; I didn't know that "spoofing" was a recent computer technical jargon and naturally took in its primary (nay--only) sense given in print-form dictionaries. So I'll retract the prior half of my charge.
I'm not all that bothered by J, personally - if his insults were anywhere Close to on-target, I might be concerned, but he thinks I'm in some way a Ted Haggard type. And he calls Jacques Jewish...Teehee!
but I am a bit disappointed that he seems to bring out the worst in Stu.
Stu! My man! Where'd the good ol' calm, collected, genial, logical guy go? Bring back Doc Jekyll!
He might not be Entertaining, but he's solid.
We need solid around here. Like, desperately.
JADL—
So I'll retract the prior half of my charge.
I thought you'd see that way, once your underlying misunderstanding was cleared up.
Let me then move to the second half.
he even finishes up another leaden attempt at sarcasm
Let me suggest that it is not the place of either the author of sarcasm or his target to judge the quality thereof, a generalization in spirit of my colleague's sensible proposal that the term "poet" can never properly be bestowed on one's self.
... by parodying the language of a Protestant dinner benediction!
Good catch! Curiously, this particular dinner blessing has never been used in my family, and so never gained the authority of the Spirit's word in my mind through use and habit, as other forms have. My father had the standard Catholic table grace ingrained in him while in the army, "Bless us oh Lord, and these thy gifts... ," which is the form I use. His father used Luther's grace, "Bless this food to our use, and us to thy service... ." Now, he said it as if it were a single word, and in was only in my late teens, reading the Small Catechism, that I finally realized exactly what he was saying. My mother's father died more than 40 years ago, and sadly, I cannot recall the blessing he used.
Brett—
Stu! My man! Where'd the good ol' calm, collected, genial, logical guy go? Bring back Doc Jekyll!
He might not be Entertaining, but he's solid.
We need solid around here. Like, desperately.
Thanks :-). I'll try to do better. But I don't think it is J that is bringing out my sarcastic side.
So it's JADL that's been pushin' your buttons, Stu?
I Get JADL, to a degree - I know he has a face, and I have some sense of his history, and I understand that his natural inclination is toward the fight.
I know that he's a teabaggin' quasi-monarchist with a classical bent.
He mocks, ad hominems, and condescends more than he thinks he does, but with his encyclopedic brain and unique point of view, he's a great asset when he's not lobbing puerile insults (dressed up in classicist clothing) and labeling those with whom he disagrees as 'bozos,' etc.
That being said, when it comes to the slap-fight between JADL and J, I can't help but side with the ol' man as the more civilized of the two - I do believe that this was the first time JADL was the Recipient of an offer for an in-person fist-fight.
And JADL has never had the sort of racist bent that J seems to have, or quite the same baseless labels - I mean, JADL mocked me for wearing birkenstocks when I actually don't (chacos baby!) but nothing nearly as off-base and counter-reality as callin' me a follower of Ted Haggard.
And J - your point of view (which I've yet to find a center to, not sure if that's my fault or yours) may be wildly different than many of ours, but if you bring the tone of the debate up a notch, we'll engage with you on a more civilized level...we won't just banish you or dismiss your point of view outright...
There might be some banter or some prodding and pushing here and there, but you seem like a smart bloke, which, along with being crazy, is one of the two requirements for hanging out here for an extended period of time.
I think we'd all appreciate it, though, if you took a step back from the labeling, anger, and negativity and present your point of view with a bit more humility and sense of humor.
At least wait a little while and get a better sense of who y'er talkin' to...You won't be an outcast here just because you're weird and have a weird point of view. We're like the protagonists in a kid's sports movie - a tangled and tumbled crew of weirdos and ne'er-do-wells who, by accepting each other, rise to the challenge to overcome the evil team full of homogenous good-lookin' blonde kids with the crew-cut coach.
Just don't punch us in the groin so much during practice. A few towel-slaps are fine, but no need to get so base so early...
Brett—
So it's JADL that's been pushin' your buttons, Stu?
Yup.
He mocks, ad hominems, and condescends more than he thinks he does, but with his encyclopedic brain and unique point of view, he's a great asset when he's not lobbing puerile insults (dressed up in classicist clothing) and labeling those with whom he disagrees as 'bozos,' etc.
Well, I have a few other complaints with JADL, but I certainly acknowledge that he has both an excellent classical education and a unique and potentially valuable point of view. But even taking your position on this, if you knock out the posts of his that are mocking, ad hominem, etc., and give him points for the remaining posts in which his positive attributes are applied in a way to usefully further the debate, you get what? 2%? That he's evidently satisfied with such a low signal/noise ratio is already a serious mark against him.
That being said, when it comes to the slap-fight between JADL and J, I can't help but side with the ol' man as the more civilized of the two - I do believe that this was the first time JADL was the Recipient of an offer for an in-person fist-fight.
I recall one other such offer, maybe a couple months ago. JADL certainly has a way of inspiring physical confrontation phantasies.
My sympathies are more conditioned on who picked the fight: Sure, J was throwing the glassware around, but at no one in particular, and then JADL started talking about his mother.
Neither J nor JADL seem to have it in them to turn the thermostat down. I grade JADL down more than J for this, because JADL presents himself as a scholar, and an elder, and demands the respect that such titles confer, but refuses to live up to their obligations in discussion. We know little of J, but at least he's not telling us he's one thing, and then acting as another.
In terms of this particular fight, it's kind of like watching JADL fighting a younger version of himself. All the anger's there, but a bit less erudition and a bit more energy. JADL would have us intervene on his side, because he is the scholar and elder. My reaction, "Maybe if you had acted like one." And it is amusing to see that he can't take what he himself dishes out. So I'll referee a bit if one of them misattributes remarks, but aside from that, I don't have a dog in their fight—lap or pit.
And JADL has never had the sort of racist bent that J seems to have, or quite the same baseless labels - I mean, JADL mocked me for wearing birkenstocks when I actually don't (chacos baby!) but nothing nearly as off-base and counter-reality as callin' me a follower of Ted Haggard.
JADL does not have the racist invective, J does. Points off for J, of course. Yet the Conrad-Achebe discussion was interesting, race was a central issue and potentially incendiary issue, yet it didn't get out of hand.
It seems to me that in almost all of the discussions that get out of hand on this blog, JADL is in the midst of it, making sure the temperature stays nice and high. If he's not a central player, he's a catalyst. Moreover, almost all discussions he gets involved in get out of hand, one way or another.
stu:
"then JADL started talking about his mother" What? Where? Who's used repeated obscene references on this score (we all make mistaken attributions--as I did recently for reading "JA" for "J" in Brett's comments--and I think you've done that here)
Is what you mean by "confrontation," our possible meeting at a festival and my welcome to your invitation to share a brew and my counter-suggestion that we'd find much more to talk about than our political differences? (as I recall, it proved too far for you to travel in the end, and you said your wife was sceptical of what the point of meeting with an ideological foe--though neighbour--could be).
Brett's analysis of the rhetorical situation on this blogsite seems pretty sensible; probably he enjoys himself on this site at least as much as any blogger (Kirby acknowledges this too). Kirby also prizes humour, and believe me, I've had more and more fun through the yrs crossing swords with adversaries. You've done it--it's fun; it doesn't mean we've no conviction about our views. I'll repeat John Gay's epitaph:
"Life's a jest, and all things show it/
I once thought so, but now I know it."
JADL—
"then JADL started talking about his mother" What? Where? Who's used repeated obscene references on this score (we all make mistaken attributions--as I did recently for reading "JA" for "J" in Brett's comments--and I think you've done that here)
I was speaking metaphorically. Wasn't that clear enough? J comes in here, and takes a few roundhouse swings at all of us, EPOE, all that. I didn't see any connect. (Transition from metaphorical to literal...) Then, or so it seemed to me, you took it to the next level by personalizing it, and he responded in kind, with interest. And so it has continued.
Is what you mean by "confrontation," our possible meeting at a festival and my welcome to your invitation to share a brew and my counter-suggestion that we'd find much more to talk about than our political differences? (as I recall, it proved too far for you to travel in the end, and you said your wife was sceptical of what the point of meeting with an ideological foe--though neighbour--could be).
Not at all. I did not see that as a potential confrontation, let alone a physical confrontation. And yes, despite all, you remain my neighbor, and I continue to think about how best to be a neighbor to you. Such thoughts usually revolve around my avuncular faculty mentor persona, if I'm recalling the right formula, and I fear that they would be unwelcome.
No, I was referring to J and that earlier offer. Am I correct in remembering an earlier calling-out?
"Life's a jest, and all things show it
I once thought so, but now I know it."
Well, you and I aren't in the ground yet, so we still have a bit of time to figure this out.
stu:
Pardon me, Signor stu, if I missed your subtly cryptic "metaphors" for the blatantly literal sort of obscene references regurgitated repeatedly before your eyes by the filthy, slime-mouthed, eminently lazy and defective pachuco gibberish of "no-face" J.
But to tell the truth, I thought I'd just wind and spin this dude round a bit after he/she/it (who knows?--could be a space alien, for all we know) condescendingly addressed me very early on (second short post, I believe) as "pops." Then for me it just took flight from there (ever had a clueless ingenu call you that, Herr Professor Doktor Kurtz?). Trouble with J's swampy lingo is that its rhetorical effect diminishes with its every invocation (or better, imprecation), like Satan's dwindling voice in "Paradise Lost," until its stage-thunder is reduced to . . . nil. . . . bor-ring . . . tired . . . can't read on. . . .
But still, J COULD be a recruit for your own blogsite, if you fancy that . . . .
JADL—
Pardon me, Signor stu, if I missed your subtly cryptic "metaphors" for the blatantly literal sort of obscene references regurgitated repeatedly... by ... J
You're pardoned. So, you took the part about throwing glassware around as something that could literally happen on a blog? I really wasn't aiming to be subtle or cryptic in setting up a metaphor between a bar fight and your ongoing interchange with J.
But to tell the truth, I thought I'd just wind and spin this dude round a bit after he/she/it (who knows?--could be a space alien, for all we know) condescendingly addressed me very early on (second short post, I believe) as "pops."
Yeah. But "sow the wind" is only half the quote. And you're taking offense too easily.
(ever had a clueless ingenu call you that, Herr Professor Doktor Kurtz?)
If I did, I didn't take offense. Which probably means, I've never had a clueless ingenu call me "pops" in that tone. I'll count it as an advantage that I've taught UC students, who actually seem to want to be in the class I'm teaching.
But this gets back to J. It's hard to judge tone in email, and without actually looking at his posting, I don't want to claim any deeper insight than that. But I wonder if perhaps you heard that ingenu in J?
Trouble with J's swampy lingo is that its rhetorical effect diminishes with its every invocation
That's the problem with swearing. If you want it to be effective, you have to use it very sparingly. Most people don't have the necessary discipline.
But still, J COULD be a recruit for your own blogsite, if you fancy that
He's made a few appearances, trying to figure things out. He's been perfectly civil over there, which makes the difference here all the more striking.
Jadl with his usual banal style point: but his..rhetoric! My rhetoric's fine, punk; in fact I am a professional editor (along with being networking pro.) Your whines are barely ESL.
This was not about rhetoric anyway, or your favored literary fashions. The central problem is your (and Olson's) fallacious if not juvenile assumption that opposition to the Limbaugher right, FoxCo, or biblethumpers implies supporting communism.
Sort of deeep, but with more work with the Limbaugh ESL students maybe you'll comprendez-voooo it.
Well, very early on in the game I asked J to give us a sample of what he has published (or edited), but without much result. . . . Perhaps he might be a bit more specific about the duties and accomplishments of a "networking pro" so we might distinguish those better from those of an experienced drug-dealer (could be the his overly-agitated eye or unhealthy cast of the skin). . . .
Em and I also do professional editing and I've done business translating (from Italian and French), scholarly (also hard-copy) editing and translating (from Latin, Italian, and French primarily, but also from Greek and German), and literary translation (from French and Italian). I've a PhD in English from the U of Washington, an MA in English from Portland State U and an MA in history from the U of Oregon.
Em and I have both taught ESL; other than my English and lit classes (OE and ME Chaucer, Shakespeare, 17th-18th lit, genre courses in short stories and the novel, etc, Great Books & Rhet, English Comp, Adolecent lit, South Asian novel in English, etc as well as beginning Italian), I've professionally tutored in Latin, Italian, and French. But this is aside from my other lives as soldier (2 yrs), factory worker (2 yrs), hospital worker (8 yrs), and secondary school teacher--2 yrs sub, 4 yrs history and French). In each case I can be specific about this experience, and my publications are available (as are Kirby's, stu's, and others on this blogsite). So, I'll invite J to show us more on his achievements than he's done so up to now that might prepare us to understand the bases for some of his (sometimes preemptory) judgements about literary, philosophical, artistic, and historical productions. In short, from "punk": show us what you've got, snot, 'n' "Gardy-loo!"
Not sure where I'm supposed to have issued the formula, "aut Limbaugh aut communism," but if J can produce it, I'll answer. God knows there are plenty of silly academic Marxists around academia, especially in what used to be called the humanities. Rightists are harder to find in academia, sometimes to avoid openly prejudicial hiring practises, sometimes just to avoid silly and juvenile pc foghorning and nagging episodes from Welcome Wagon leftists. . . . On this prob stu turns a customary blind eye and stubbornly refuses to consult any but poop-poohing leftist sources like the AAUP. . . .
On the abuse tennis match, there is a centuries-old Thames tradition of boatmen engaging in this game of slinging epithets--even the staid Dr Johnson respected the tradition, and J has shown himself on this score to be a more-than-eager enthusiastic traditionalist--allors, bouge-toi, foutu pedale, et "Vive la Bastille, racaille miserable!"
Early on, I asked for your US passport.
Perhaps you could define a tautology for me, or translate some hex or binary, or do a reductio on ONE "argument" you have offered, showing it valid. Or provide an argument against analytical and synthetic truths (since you're merely offering the usual snide, aesthetic belches--neither axiomatic, or empirical in the broad sense). You have no real facts to deal with, so resort to the usual Slate like invective-lite.
Your "aesthetics" rates as tasteless, shoddy, Philistinish as well--Rush, Fox, GOP,Beck, Hannity --c'est Philistinisme
You don't deal with logic, OR evidentiary reasoning. And I don't care whether you wrote 10 essays on your love for Nabakov, zionist-monarchism, or Aynnie Rand-- even Miss Rand could mangle a bit of Aristotle.
Well, J, I'd like to put aside political polemics for a while and read more of your philosophical turn. Although I haven't had more than one course in symbolic logic and one in traditional Aristotelian (decades ago), I think I'm capable of following a lay logical argument (extended formal logical questions I'd have to leave to stu or consult a former colleague and friend of mine who's a theoretical mathematician). I of course know what a tautology is, or a petitio pricipii, or an ad hominem, a tu quoque (not identical with an ad hominem I have to say), a tertium non datur, etc, and I've read at least long (how deeply is not for me to judge) in the great names in philosophy, so I'm at least prepared to profit from others who seem to have drunk more deeply at the origines et fontes of philosophy and after. So I'll be watching for your contributions on this score, though with Kierkegaard's aphorism in mind: "There is a system of logic, but there is no system of human existence." Cheers sans sneers, JA
JADL—
Aristotelian Logic?! Hilbert and Ackermann wrote "Principles of Mathematical Logic" in '28, and gave a complete analysis of both the strengths and weakness of that system. Theirs' is a brilliant book (especially its elegant analysis of the independence of systems of axioms for propositional logic, a result I explained to a graduate student earlier this week). But really, Hilbert-Ackermann put to Aristotelian logic to rest, in favor of much more expressive and powerful systems, notably (but not exclusively) the first-order predicate calculus, in which most of mathematics gets formalized these days.
And this was the basis for so much fruitful thought: the completeness and incompleteness theorems, compactness, ZFC, independence, etc. Of course, the antecedents of the first order predicate calculus go back to Hilbert's notes from around 1905-ish, and the calculus of relations (a somewhat different, but related, formal system) rests firmly on a brilliant (if rarely read) paper by C. S. Peirce from 1880, IIRC. But Hilbert-Ackermann was a watershed in the teaching of logic, and (to paraphrase Perlis's description of Algol), a notable improvement not only on its predecessors, but on most of its successors.
Aristotelian Logic?! Taught mere decades ago?! The coelacanth of logical thought! I am amazed. Not critical, as I suppose it has historical importance for the understanding of ancient texts. Just amazed.
stu:
I'm a bit amazed that you're amazed that an introductory course in the history of logic should concentrate on Aristotle and his development of syllogistic logic and its subsequent treatment in the later Middle Ages and beyond. The course wasn't meant by any means to portray Aristotle's great formal achievement and traditional logic as the ne plus ultras of logical thought, for there were two other following courses treating 19th and 20th c developments, including an intro to the propositional calculus, types of inferences, the functional calculus, etc that unfortunately and ironically conflicted with a freshman calculus course required for my then proposed programme of studies. Nevertheless, I found the course quite valuable for the 17 yr old I was then in learning of analyses of traditional syllogisms, of the difference between predicative and existential use of the copula, truth-tables, traditional laws of thought, etc. And I've always been interested in the watershed periods of scientific discovery, for though every halfway attentive schoolgirl or boy in high school physics class "knows" more physics today than Newton, "they discovered what we only have to learn."
JADL—
Oh, history of logic. That makes all the difference. I had a student write a dissertation on the history of the foundations of model theory (think of this as the semantics side of what Hilbert was up to). That's how I learned about Peirce's paper, and finally came to grips with Löwenheim's notorious paper (which is written in the calculus of relations, although often interpreted in the first-order predicate calculus).
Truth-tables though, are a surprisingly new invention. Bizarre though it may seem, they're credited to Wittgenstein. You'd think they'd have been around forever, but it seems not. They're definitely a projection of more modern thought back into history, an anachronism.
And the choice between calculus and modern formal logic isn't an obvious one. Both introduce you to modern mathematical thought (through their non-constructive elements), and both have practical utility. Calculus is by far the more common, and often, and in your case, mandated choice. But I'd think for people doing non-scientific analytic work, modern logic would have been a more helpful choice. But who at 17 knows how they'll be formed as a man, or how the choices they make (or are required of them then) will seem forty years on?
stu:
Thanks for your indulgent commentary on what I remember of this logic history course I took so long ago. I'm sure I've one of the books somewhere boxed up along with most of my philosophy
library--I'll try to locate it in storage. Because of my youthful shame of ignorance and desire to overcome the typically shabby American public school neglect of languages (classical and modern foreign) my interest and limited competence turned more to the study of natural language than to the narrower confines of formal language.
For most writing situations, Aristotelian term logic will suffice--even Frege granted that when he translated the Square of Opposition into predicate form.
Propositional logic has issues which most logicians are not aware of (like the grammatical issue). And the verification issue still matters, however vull-gar: an argument is no better than its premises. Any real-world argument relies on evidential concerns--establishing premises, data, demographics, stats,etc--unless merely tautological . Journalists, lawyers, scientists, researchers generally still uphold evidentialism, regardless of what postmodernists might claim.
Wittgenstein did present truth tables in the Tractatus, but reductio ad absurdum methods were known for years. Wittgenstein also later realized the limits of symbolic logic, and moved slightly towards induction, and language-oriented study. Formal, predicate logic has a certain elegance to it, as do proofs, but in itself quite limited in application.
Evidentialism generally takes precedence over formality, certainly in politics, history, journalism. That holds for theological claims as well--as with the supposed inerrancy of scripture, as Hume well knew. Most believers react rather violently to Hume's points contra- miracles/inerracy, and the problems of testimony, vs uniformity of experience, but they should at least read Hume on miracles. Scripture should not be mistaken for history; it's more akin to Bulfinch. Jefferson also had some thoughts along those lines.
J, you and stu've got me keen on getting my philosophy books out of storage and having another go at them (on-line scanning doesn't work well for me).
I remember my early and continuing resistance to reduction-ism, like reducing humans to concatenations of molecules and atoms (materialism or Aristotelian material causes) or truth to power relations (post-structuralism a la Foucault or of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic) as well as strong forms of sceptical empiricism (Humean rejections of necessity in causation and the possibility of metaphysics--for empiricism itself seems a pretty metaphysical idea and the Humean primacy of senses in relation to the intellect seems far different than in Aquinas' Latin Aristotelian "nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu"), and agreeing with realism in its more traditional sense (this reminds me to take the time to review the language work of Russell, Frege, and Tarski--which I've too long neglected--when I finish the translation work I'm currently engaged in). Cheers, JA
J—
OK, I'll bite.
Propositional logic has issues which most logicians are not aware of (like the grammatical issue)
Say more...
Verbs, tense, Time, and more.
Logic works well with established facts, classes, mathematical axioms, but introduce something like modality, value, intention and there are problems.
Consider "Stan Loves Anne." Or via Law of excluded middle--"Stan Loves Anne, OR Stan doesn't love Anne."
Well, he might some of the time. He says he does. Or perhaps they are married. But Love is not like some fact, or obvious condition like, say, "Stan gave Anne a ring." He might love her today a lot, tomorrow not so much. Whatever Love is, it's not like a circuit that can be turned off and on, as logic would have us believe. Not really discrete.
Many sentences demonstrate that issue as well, even "He is guilty, or He is not guilty." In some cases, yes, it is discrete: OJ killed Her, or did not kill her. But the law recognizes degrees of guilt at times, even with murder--well, he walked in on his wife with another man, etc. Or, he killed in self-defense, etc.
It's rare that there is some perfectly discrete situation---yes, with your computer, it's on or off. But not with many human situations.
That is not just a problem with the Law of Excluded Middle, but with verb tense, and other language issues. Syntax at times dictates the logic, the propositional function--even one might say truth.
J—
OK. But isn't that what modal logics of time are for? There's a really good treatment of these theories in Goldblatt's Logics of Time and Computation.
And you can handle this propositionally, albeit at the cost of adding a time parameter, and a multisorted universe, e.g.,
\forall time t. "stan loves anne @ time t" or not "stan loves anne @ time t."
The issue really isn't that first-order predicate logic can't handle these situations, so much as it seems like overkill in these situations, and it would be nice to have logics have lower algorithmic complexity.
J—
Let me follow up a bit. I agree that there is not yet a satisfactory logical account of human meaning in all of its myriad nuances.
It is reasonable to ask whether or not it is even possible in practice. The entire discipline of computational neuroscience is predicated on the belief that it is, and certainly progress is being made in language and vision (which presents analogous problems). An interesting recent development has been that people are thinking seriously about the Turing Test, some about how to actually implement it, some about whether or not it really is philosophically adequate.
But my take on this is that if a finite symbolic approach is possible, it will probably prove possible to encode it relatively transparently into the first order predicate calculus. This doesn't mean it's the most appropriate system, though.
Actually, I object to
modal logic (and 2nd order logic, as far as I understand it--as far as predicating over attributes, or something). Modal logic used to be known as "probability"--at least most modal issues seem to relate to probability, contingency, statistics.
When applied to external reality, logic of any sort quickly becomes statistics, if not physics. Some members of the Vienna Circle--was it Schlick?/--actually discussed that. I think Wittgenstein of the Tractatus nearly says that: that logic, the Great Mirror, does not concern external reality but is merely a play of tautologies and contradictions, at least in terms of establishing validity (rather than the truth of particular sentences, claims). It may have some uses--as with comp. sci,or programming--but not a type of natural science. First order Logic shows Validity, but many mistake that for Truth. The truth issue is separate (as Tarski suggested, but I have not mastered Tarski's semantics, and not competely in agreement).
And thinking about it, the problem with "love" as a verb relates to the premise/verification issue--Truth. In an informal sense we understand love, but really when asked to define it, we would call upon a neurologist, associate it with certain bio-chemical processes, pheromones, hormones etc. My point is that many words are like love--they point to processes (and thus time), and not well-defined objects or classes. Sort of obvious perhaps--I think Quine sort of waved his hand at the issue. But in some sense it seems relevant.
J—
Hmm... The modal logics I've studied are based ultimately on "possible worlds" semantics, and to me are reasonable ways to deal with contingent thinking. Not really probability theory. Second order logic is altogether different. The problem with second-order theories is that there's no completeness theorem, and no model theory either—the logics are so strong that categoricity (capturing a particular model up to isomorphism) is the rule of the day. Indeed, the induction axiom (viewed as a single sentence in the second order language of (0,S) captures (\omega,0,S) up to isomorphism (this is sometimes called the Dedekind rigidity theorem).
Tarski's semantics aren't hard at all (the basic idea is just to formalize the meaning of a model, i.e., you have to specify a particular universe, and particular meanings of the function and relation symbols of your language, along with a valuation map (to give meaning to any free variables), and then there's a simple inductive map from 1st order formulae to {True,False}). Really, you just follow your nose. I can't imagine what you'd find to disagree with. You are, however, limited to a particular mathematical definition of model.
The point of the completeness theorem is that for pure logic, truth and provability are equivalent, despite very different definitions.
Of course, in the real world, you have problems that aren't present in mathematics -- did we get the formalism right? are our axioms true? These, as you correctly note, are evidential problems, and they can't be established by purely logical means. Logic does what it can, but no more, in helping us understand the world.
As for "love," etc., you're really far beyond what mathematical logic was ever intended to deal with. It's kind of like arguing that a jack handle makes a poor paint brush. True enough, but it's hardly a reasonable criticism of the jack handle...
Even with first-order logic, undecidability is an issue (isnt that Godel's first incompleteness theorem?/)---the question is whether an undecidable argument, or set of premises, really, in first order logic falls under GFIT. The halting problem suggests that. My symbolic logic course was some years ago (though I have done discrete math as well, for some computing stuff)--but the halting problem ala Church (and Turing I guess) shows that some arguments are not solvable, or computable--both for arithmetic, and logic per se. Goedel expanded on that. And there aren't rules which tell you in advance what argument can be proven, or not. I tend to think any glitches in the system (ala Turing) are really sort of variations of Russell's Paradox, and negligible, except when it's some massive number cruching--say, in relation to a hurricane, etc--
And it's not really Truth, but Soundness, AND Completeness--which gets pretty deep for a comment box. At any rate, to get S and C. you have to have all axioms be provable, ie deducible, so it seems to me if there ARE ANY arguments of any sort that are not provable, than S, and C do not hold--you can create S and C systems, or domains perhaps (and finiteness an issue), but in a broad sense they do NOT hold.
Modal logic's another issue. And I do think it relates to probability theory, at least if any real world situation is involved. I object to the sort of modal games--ie, "If x is necessary, then x is possible". It seems vacuous, as they say--then most formalism does. when you merely say something's possible, you have not really said anything. And really, that's one reason I object to some of the new theologians who use odd modal arguments to prove about anything.
The point on the law of the excluded however,does seem to me an issue (as it was for the intuitionists)--even the law of non-contradiction may at times be problematic. As are the language problems. I think that's what Wittgenstein of the Tractatus also suggested: don't use sentences, or propositions (which ever terms you prefer), but just variables and logical form works (apart from the later Church/Goedel incompleteness). But use a proposition, and try to assign truth to it and you are doing something like induction. It's something I have been contemplating, seems a bit trivial perhaps and needs more work--but it's a bit odd to think that language itself cannot work with formal logic, except in an informal sense.
J—
The completeness theorem implies that the consequences of any computably axiomatizable first order theory are computably enumerable—just search all possible proofs. Even this isn't possible in second order (there is no recursive axiomatization of pure 2nd order logic).
Yeah, these days we refer to the Church-Turing Thesis, rather than just Church's thesis. For good reason, in my opinion, even though I'm a lambda-calculus fan, unlike most computability theorists.
This is all part of the reason why it often makes sense to try to fit a weaker (less powerful, less expressive) logic to a given problem. E.g., proveability in the classical propositional calculus is co-NP complete. Not cheap (exponential time, given known algorithms), but a darn sight better than undecidable. Similarly, provability in the intuitionistic propositional calculus is PSpace-complete (and again, exponential time algorithms are the best known). Modal logics propositional logics are usually PSpace-complete, hardly surprising given that intuitionistic propositional logic is often described in terms of a modal semantics (Kripke models).
And it's not really Truth, but Soundness, AND Completeness--which gets pretty deep for a comment box.
No kidding. Completeness is relevant only w.r.t. a semantics. This is why some constructive mathematicians doesn't buy that intuitionism is the "right" logic. A long story.
At any rate, to get S and C. you have to have all axioms be provable, ie deducible, so it seems to me if there ARE ANY arguments of any sort that are not provable, than S, and C do not hold
This is a bit confused. Axioms are axioms, and are not proven (otherwise, they'd be theorems). They're just asserted. The axioms for the pure 1st order logic are all sound, which is probably what you meant.
I think a detalied discussion of modal logics really is beyond the comments box. Given your level of discourse and background, I think you'd enjoy Goldblatt's Logics of Time and Computation. It is readable, and if you like playing with propositional logics, its a gas.
As for whether something like the law of the excluded middle is problematic, I think it is perhaps better to say that classical logic isn't the "right" logic for all situations. But it is right for much of mathematics, where it is reasonable to assume that every well-formed closed statement is either true or false. It's different if you're doing constructive mathematics, of course, since then intuitionistic logics are the "right fit." And I agree that noa-one yet knows the right logic (if any) for (natural) language.
You sound like a platonist of some sort (as do most modal types). I hold to constructivism of a sort--perhaps not complete nominalism, but not realism ala Plato/Frege--(though starting out with chopping off numerical infinity works. Maybe universals as well, except with defined, finite domains). Existence generalizations will do for most situations.
We might use necessity, a priori, "analytical" but only with a certain pragmatism in mind (Im not a complete Quinean). Modus ponens, quantifiers, rules of inference aren't floating out in some heavenly space apart from our brains, anymore than Euclidian axioms, or chess rules are.
I don't think you realize how odd modal logic, or "possible worlds" are, at least if taken in some metaphysical sense. Eventualities, outcomes are not worlds (and that also applies to the pop-mystic readings of quantum physics)--anymore than all the possible crap table-outcomes that did not occur on specific rolls of the dice are.
Re undecidability, it's really the proof procedure, not the theory, or whatever. There are first order arguments which are undecidable--as Church showed. That's the halting problem. Perusing Boolos/Jeffrey again, FOL is complete in regards to validity, but incomplete in regards to invalidity (to be very brief). In effect, if you can't prove invalidity of some set of premises and conclusion, you are left with undecidability. That's Church. But I think you can get around that via finiteness, various clerical routines, or some limits on recursivity,--ostension etc. (again to be brief) Your computer works, your programs/apps work, C works, SQL works. Obviously the paradoxes and incompleteness don't realize themselves in real world, or computing, except when you get to some massive computations,like hurricanes, oceans, etc.
J—
Actually, I'm not strongly committed to any particular mathematical philosophy. Or, to be more accurate, I fit my philosophy to the context. When I'm writing programs, I'm a constructivist. When I'm proving theorems, I'm usually working from a classical framework, a platonist in intuition, but a formalist in terms of actual proofs.
I've got no problems reasoning about infinity, or even multiple infinites. There's too much math that you have to throw out if you're going to play a strict finitistic game. Set theory, for starters... And even CS types have to deal with potential infinities.
My take on modal logics is different from yours. In particular, consider Kripke semantics for propositional logic. In that case, possible worlds refer to possible futures, and I don't see a conceptual problem at all. We may know that certain types of futures are possible, and others not, and our particular path may depend on things we can't model (free will, quantum effects, stuff that's just to complicated to compute, etc.) In this case, we'll know more as the future unfolds (intuitionism is monotonic, after all). I call this the temporal-epistemic interpretation of intuitionism, and it has real utility. At the end of the day, modal logics either are appropriate or inappropriate for a given situation. Possible worlds semantics (if thought of as a way of dealing with incomplete information, and possible worlds that might complete that uncertainty) doesn't seem crazy either, at least to me. What does seem crazy is a one-size fits all approach to logic.
Re undecidability, it's really the proof procedure, not the theory, or whatever.
But... the theory is what falls out of the proof procedure. A theory is simply a set of formulae closed under proof.
There are first order arguments which are undecidable--as Church showed. That's the halting problem.
Careful here. The halting problem is a complete computably enumerable set. Yes, that means that it is not computable, but it is still "computationally accessible" in an important sense. But to say that a first order argument is undecidable is something I can't figure out. If by argument you mean proof, then you're simply mistaken—a proof is a finite object that can be checked. If you mean consequence, then it it is a computably enumerable question. Not decidable (the issue, as you note, is while it is always possible to demonstrate a proof of entailment, it is not always possible to provide a proof of non-entailment). And pretty much all of these tail-twisting results (undecidability of the halting problem, the incompleteness theorem, the recursion theorem, etc.) depend on encodings of Epimenides' Paradox.
Note that theories of finite models are always decideable—you can actually compute Tarski's definition of truth directly in such cases, and indeed the complexity isn't usually so bad (basically, it's going to be a polynomial who's order equals the maximal depth of quantifier nesting).
I don't think that computers are paradoxical objects, irrespective of scale. They're powerful tools, with a variety of limits, some of which are simply intrinic to the entire class of devices.
re halting problem. It's about the proof of validity or not of a specific conclusion from a set of statements, usually via a reductio ad absurdum, or "tree method." Not really about paradox, though at times, a self-reflexive type of statement cannot be shown to be invalid--they are akin to Russell's Paradox, not just the old epimenides chestnut (which is, arguably not a real paradox), or they are recursive, never ending (apparently). The completeness theorem shows that first order logic is valid; all valid inferences (conclusions, deductions) can be shown as such. But it doesn't show that some inferences, which seem invalid, ARE invalid, more or less. That's the decision problem (or halting as it formerly was known as). Entailment is a different issue than deduction or validity.
re halting problem. It's about the proof of validity or not of a specific conclusion from a set of statements, usually via a reductio ad absurdum, or "tree method."
The halting problem is the question of whether or not a given computation on a Turing Machine will ever halt, usually phrased diagonally, both for technical convenience (it facilitates applications of the recursion theorem) and as a historical bow to the diagonalization lemma in Gödel's proof of the incompleteness theorem. More specifically, let \phi_e denote the e-th Turing machine. Then K, the halting problem, is {e | \phi_e(e) halts}.
Many questions in logic are often reducible (often via computable many-one reductions, i.e., translations of instances of one problem to instances of the other) to K.
For example (as you note) for first order logic (FOL), the question of whether or not a given formula follows from a finite set of other formulae is reducible to K (and vice-versa).
Not all statements independent of a given theory have a kind of retrospection. There are many good examples in set theory, e.g., the relative consistency proofs of Gödel and Cohen for CH over ZFC, and not CH over ZFC, together consistute a proof that the continuum hypothesis is independent of Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory, assuming the latter is consistent.
Your account of the completeness theorem is basically correct. If a set of formulae (G) entails another (a), i.e., if every model of all of the sentences in G is also a model of a, then there is a proof of a from the hypotheses in G.
The fact that you can't prove anything false is the soundness theorem.
First order logic, and the decision problem do not concern set theory, or ZFC--that's more of the sort of modal realist attempt to change logic to...set theory. Why do you constantly shift the goal posts? The first incompleteness theorem came after Church/halting problem--it's related, directly related, but not the same, or rather the H.P shows that 1. a proof of validity or a complete clerical routine (soundness) is not a 2. proof of invalidity. The soundness only relates to 1., not to 2. There is no complete clerical routine for first or second order logic (or nth orders)
J—
I'm not shifting the goal posts. The incompleteness theorem itself relates to the application of first order to Peano Arithmetic, i.e., the theory of the natural numbers together with the operations of successor, addition, and multiplication. Gödel's incompleteness theorem showed that there was a true sentence of arithmetic that could not be proven from the Peano Axioms (again, under the ubiquitous assumption that PA is consistent), a sentence which was essentially an extremely clever translation of "I can't be proven in Peano Arithmetic." The real significance of Gödel's proof (and this was instantly grasped by Gödel and others) was that there was that PA was used only to support the coding machinery. Basically, for any "reasonable" axiom system whose consequences included the PA axioms, an analogous sentence could be constructed.
Much of computability theory rests on Gödel's proof: the basic system of definable functions that he used to build up his coding machinery was isolated and formalized as the primitive recursive functions; the general recursive (computable) functions are a generalization of this, adequate to capture the use of existential quantification in the construction of the Gödel sentence; the diagonalisation lemma was translated into the recursion theorem, etc. With this, it became possible to explore the limits of "reasonable" systems, and this became the computably axiomatizable theories, which turn out for technical reasons to be the same as the computably enumerably axiomatizable theories. These connections basically go through Kleene's mu-calculus. The connections with the lambda-calculus (and Turing Machines) wasn't filled in until later. The significance of Turing's work was that it made credible the notion that these mathematical definitions of computability (Church, Kleene, Thue, and others) were in a more intuitive sense "complete," i.e., they captured all of the computable-in-principle number-theoretic functions.
So, back to goal posts. Gödel wasn't working in pure first order logic, but in its application to PA. Since PA can be formalized in ZFC, and ZFC is computably axiomatizable (like PA, it consists of finitely many axiom schema) the incompleteness theorem applies to ZFC as well. But ZFC was distinguished because natural examples of incompleteness (e.g., CH) were first discovered there. Subsequent work has found non-self-referential statements in PA, e.g., the Paris-Harrington sentences, which are essentially modified Ramsey Theory questions.
I shifted to ZFC only because the "natural" incomplete sentences are more natural -- folks who aren't specialists know what CH is, but few people outside of the logic/computability-theory/combinatorics community know about Paris-Harrington.
H.P shows that 1. a proof of validity or a complete clerical routine (soundness) is not a 2. proof of invalidity.
This is confused. What is true is that there is a clerical routine that will eventually produce all of the consequences of a recursively axiomatizable first-order theory, but (for undecideable theories) there is no clerical routine that can similarly enumerate the non-consequences.
There is no complete clerical routine for first or second order logic (or nth orders)
Right. You can't enumerate the non-consequences, and therefore, there is no decision routine.
The original problem per Church (and then Turing) concerned the clerical routine itself--establishing both soundness (ie validity), AND completeness (proving invalidity as well). You are trying to create some bizarre metaphysical system out of it (and out of set theory I suspect), when it's more like a programming problem. It's not metaphysical except in some indirect odd way. Church was discussing ANY sort of clerical routine, ie reductio. Validity can be established via first order logic--the tree method, even truth tables will do that. But if it's invalid, or appears to be, there is no a priori routine to show that. There are ad hoc ways to avoid the problem though, by just preventing certain sets of statements (ie recursive, paradoxical).
Soundness/completeness does not really concern the foundation problem, or is tangential (another goal-post move), as is ZFC/set theory (theory of types will do for most conceivable situations, especially from a nominalist, finite perspective. As QUine also granted, more or less). Check Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey. Yet at same time, if one wants to try to prove some axiom via a proof, then it would apply, if it is not valid (but as you noted, axioms are not generally provable. n +1 is a given, like the law of non contradiction).
While I don't pretend to be Goedel, there are some who question his numbering system. Church/Turing show the problem os undecidability in a tangible manner. Goedel uses an odd highly abstract technique (ie turning numbers into syntax, really) and proves something. Another issue I toy with, but will take more research.
J—
I've just scanned Church '36. I'd not read it before. I probably read Turing's article for the first time 30 years ago.
So let's try again. Both Church and Turing are resting on Gödel's incompleteness theorem. The technical content of Church's theorem amounts to showing how to encode the integers into the lambda-calculus (via what are still widely known as "Church Numerals"), and a proof that the functions of the Kleene mu-calculus (described before) are lambda-definable. This enables him to pull off a Gödel-like encoding of the lambda-terms into the Church numerals, and with it a proof that the lambda-calculus is not powerful enough to determine whether or not a given lambda-term has a normal form. I've seen this all before (cf. Barendregdt), but without being attuned to the historical context.
Turing's paper is similiar, but approaches the problem of defining a computable function in a radically different way, giving a "machine model." Again, he shows that turing machines can be encoded, and that there exists a "universal" Turing machine. This is a TM that takes two arguments -- conceptually a program and an input, although both are really just integers written in unary(!). The Universal machine then simulates the machine described by the program, and halts if and only if the encoded machine would have halted on the same input. The undecidability (by turing machines) of the halting problem follows pretty quickly.
And then, both models can be arithmetized (stated in the language of PA), and this shows that PA is undecidable (by TMs or lambda-terms). The identification of each with the more general, informal notion of "computability" was something the authors accepted, but which required time for the larger community to accept. Truth be told, it was accepted in Turing's form first, but then the proofs of equivalence came.
As for soundness, completeness, we can argue back and forth, but I'm confident that I understand them fully. I do have a Ph.D. in Mathematical Logic, and have taught logic at both the undergraduate and graduate level. I don't have Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey, but since that's just another introductory text, I doubt that I'd gain any new insights into the basic questions.
Goedel uses an odd highly abstract technique (ie turning numbers into syntax, really)
Actually, it's bi-directional, but I'm aware of no real controversy.
Boolos//Burgess/Jeffrey's Computability and Logic is NOT an introductory text, ala Bergmann, but used in upper division/grad (often in computer science)--perhaps you should check it out. Nor is Jeffrey's Symbolic Logic, if including the last chapters on undecidability, completeness, Goedel: I find it odd that you have completed a Phd and don't know their work, which is sort of central.
You are correct only insofar that Church was working with the Lambda calculus, and not with what Jeffrey calls an abacus program (closer to Turing, and Post's work), but it had direct applications to computability (and uncomputability).
Goedel was trying to disprove Russell/Whitehead (and did, if you accept his methods), and the claim that Peano's axioms could provide a complete deductive system for ALL arithmetic. They couldn't--- but it's not evident that mathematicians, or Russell had even said that. The math.people still accept Peano's basic five axioms, in first order logic. Goedel did not exactly overthrow mathematical induction, natural numbers, or recursivity (and there was an issue remaining with Hilbert's idea of finiteness--).
Church/Turing were applying the "entscheidungsproblem" to computability. Turing calls it "solvable/unsolvable problems." That's the programming issue, not exactly the same as the "pure" logicians' interest.
Either way, set theory's another matter---related .
J—
Boolos//Burgess/Jeffrey's Computability and Logic is NOT an introductory text, ala Bergmann, but used in upper division/grad (often in computer science)--perhaps you should check it out. Nor is Jeffrey's Symbolic Logic, if including the last chapters on undecidability, completeness, Goedel: I find it odd that you have completed a Phd and don't know their work, which is sort of central.
BBJ is a text that would be used for the first class in logic that a mathematics student would likely encounter. Hence, introductory. I know that philosophy majors often have a prequel class, which focuses more on developing facility with formal systems. The math students are expected to pick this up more quickly. I'm assuming here that Bergmann is an exemplar text for the this prequel course.
I see BBJ as an equivalent to Enderton, Mendelson, Bell and Machover, etc.
I know of their text, I just don't have it. And I'd argue that while the material in their text is indeed central, but their relationship to it is as packagers, not as originators. The same material is readily available in other sources.
Goedel was trying to disprove Russell/Whitehead (and did, if you accept his methods), and the claim that Peano's axioms could provide a complete deductive system for ALL arithmetic. They couldn't--- but it's not evident that mathematicians, or Russell had even said that. The math.people still accept Peano's basic five axioms, in first order logic. Goedel did not exactly overthrow mathematical induction, natural numbers, or recursivity (and there was an issue remaining with Hilbert's idea of finiteness--).
Gödel wasn't trying to "disprove Russell/Whitehead," he was working with Hilbert's finitism program. There's an excellent (and accessible) survey that covers this rather nicely in the introduction to the incompleteness theorem in the Handbook of Mathematical Logic.
Of course the math people still accept Peano. The issue was never that Peano was wrong, it was just whether or not one could fully apprehend the infinite by finite methods. Completeness (in the sense of being able to determine every true statement) was very much the issue, and this is what Gödel showed couldn't be done.
Got to run...
No, you're mistaken, and Im sure you haven't read it, since completeness and soundness is about half the way in, as is the treatment of Goedel, and PA. It's used in upper division, and grad. logic and computer science courses at UC ands CSUs, and that's where I encountered it. I know a professor who uses it as such.
Have you had to work with actual proofs? Id like to see your work with even Jeffrey's exercises at the end of his symbolic logic, not just the theory or jargon chanting.
J—
No, you're mistaken, and Im sure you haven't read it, since completeness and soundness is about half the way in, as is the treatment of Goedel, and PA. It's used in upper division, and grad. logic and computer science courses at UC ands CSUs, and that's where I encountered it. I know a professor who uses it as such.
Well, soundness and completeness is about half-way through the texts I cited, too. And those books are used in exactly the same space.
Have you had to work with actual proofs? Id like to see your work with even Jeffrey's exercises at the end of his symbolic logic, not just the theory or jargon chanting.
I have a Ph.D. in Mathematical Logic. My dissertation was 131 pages of mostly original mathematics, with my own theorems and proofs, in the area of computability theory. I've covered formal derivation systems as recently as three weeks ago in an honors intro programming class (we did classical propostional logic, as appropriate for that level, using a simple MP based proof system, and then a simple natural deduction system as an easier way to construct proofs).
Here are pointers to my lecture notes
CMSC-16100, Lecture 7
CMSC-16100, Lecture 8
You can safely ignore the Haskell stuff at the beginning of Lecture 7, unless you want to see notions like tautologies cast in code.
But I may try to track down BBJ anyway. I saw from the blurb on Amazon that they cover forcing, which certainly qualifies as a more advanced topic. But mostly, I'm curious about the context. Forcing was first done in Set Theory, but then pulled back into Computability Theory where it is used to define generic sets. But I'm not sure how you'd motivate generic sets outside of their original context in independence proofs.
And if I have time, I'll see if Jeffrey's is in the library, and maybe send you a few worked solutions :-).
Peace.
J—
I just tracked down a copy of BBJ, 4th edition. If there's a problem you want me to tackle in there, give it a go. I didn't find Jeffrey. What is the exact title of his book? Is it "Formal Logic: Its scope and limits"? If so, it's in the UC library, but not the local branch thereof.
Impressive Mr. Stu. Let me dig out my old Jeffrey--maybe try his exercises/proofs of the "busy beaver" (like end of 6 I think)--s not fun back a few years when I attempted. C. & L. is not too bad, until the goedel gets pretty thick--I don't deal with the modal or 2nd order . I find the sequent calculus challenging (though conceptually akin to Jeffrey's "trees"), and Peano/robinson arith. discussion interesting when I have time. The professor himself only covered about 1/3. I'm sort of busy to engage much online, in comment boxes, but maybe post on your blog, or something.
The busy-beaver stuff is in Chapter 4 of BBJ, 4th. Maybe the earlier editions had a slightly different organization. These problems are all pretty simple, and don't really involve the busy-beaver function. Is there a specific problem that warms your heart?
No, I'm referring to Jeffrey's text on Formal Logic (th' a version in BBJ, probably), where it's in 6.9, and not so simple. Not a matter of "the concepts," but the proofs.Im not asking for assistance, just a worked out proof (maybe post on your site, or something)---here's one of Jeffrey's chestnuts--
""Using Church's thesis (i.e "if a program is computable at all, it is computable by an abacus program"), explain how the busy beaver problem would be solvable if the halting problem were..."
Buena suerte
Yes, it's covered in 4 and 5 in BBJ, but Turing computability is not synonymous with the abacus machine (or with Jeffrey's problem). Obviously there's quite a bit of work involved in the proofs (whether RJ's 6.9, or BBJ's exercises in 4 and 5), and Im not asking you for them, unless yr a genius who can whip out prenex in a second (nor do I have time right now)
Use the decision procedure for the halting problem
Isn't that to beg the question sir?/ In terms of completeness there is NO decision procedure (ie proving invalidity, usually with an existence gen. that never terminates--the tree method requires endless instantiations). Let me look at it again (I have not as of yet mastered the busy beaver).
Jeffrey's abacus program, which he uses to prove the halting problem, is NOT just a tree proof, or enumeration however--it's a bit more involved.
Isn't that to beg the question sir?
Not at all. We're given the (counterfactual) hypothesis that such a procedure exists.
In effect you merely say an abacus program which give a decision procedure for all cases of the HP (ie undecidable), gives one for all the BB. I doubt the logic boys would accept that (though perhaps not a great exercise, given the counterfactual).
However I don't think you quite understand the HP, or H-function as RJ called it (atleast your comments suggest that). It shows a contradiction in ANY proposed procedure (ie clerical routine, abacus, Turing machine). See ch. 4 in BBJ--, where via two hypothetical machines, the H-function is shown to uncomputable. Yes, not super-highpowered modality, but in effect ...a counterexample to the law of non-contradiction. FNORD.
J—
In effect you merely say an abacus program which give a decision procedure for all cases of the HP (ie undecidable), gives one for all the BB.
No, I show how, given an decision procedure for the halting problem, one can compute the BB function. This was the exercise.
I doubt the logic boys would accept that (though perhaps not a great exercise, given the counterfactual).
Not a great exercise, but not terrible either. Having a decision process for the halting problem is exactly what allows the judge to dispense with a priori knowledge of a limit on the number of steps. It really is this easy.
And I keep trying to tell you, I am one of the logic boys. I have Ph.D. in Mathematical Logic, and publications in top line logic journals (JSL, APAL). I may be using a different language than you learned in BBJ, but that doesn't mean I don't know the concepts. It happens that I'm in a CS department now, and much of my research over the past 25 years has been in complexity theory, so I have research credentials in a couple of related areas—not unusual for a geezer like me.
However I don't think you quite understand the HP, or H-function as RJ called it (atleast your comments suggest that).
Again, my Ph.D. was in computability theory. Trust me, I understand the halting problem! I know that the halting problem is undecideable. Here's the canonical proof:
Suppose the halting problem is decidable. Define a total computable function f as follows:
f(n) = {\phi_n(n) + 1, if \phi_n(n) halts
0, o.w.
[Note: \phi_e(n) is standard notation for a universal computable function over an acceptable numbering, e.g., TMs, with program e on input n.]
If f is computable, it must have an index, say k (i.e., f = \phi_k). But now,
\phi_k(k) = f(k) = \phi_k(k)+1
where all three quantities are defined, but this is a contraction.
After you acknowledge this, I think I'll take down the solution to the problem above—no point poisoning the web with solutions to homework problems.
BTW, just a quick example. What BBJ calls an abacus machine appears (on the basis of a quick scan) to be what most of the logic/complexity community calls a RAM—random access machine. There's a related model called a RASP—random access stored program machine. It's a standard set of exercises to show that TMs, RAMs, RASPs, the Kleene mu-calculus, and the lambda calculus all compute exactly the same set of number-theoretic functions.
No, it's not random.
And the Turing machine is not equivalent to the abacus program: that's sort of Jeffrey's raison d'etre. Either way, the H-function is not Turing-computable,nor is the BB (yet the BB relates to productivity, or output, really--that's the computing aspect).
That equation is how the math.people approach the TM, but not quite the same as the proof offered in BBJ (which in fact shows the reductio).
Random access simply means that the storage can be accessed in any order. This contrasts with sequential access, like tape drives or DFAs. It doesn't mean stochastic behavior. More later--This is by iPhone, hardly the optimal platform for commenting!
Well, you are sort of correct that the abacus program simulates random access--unlike Turing machines. That's one reason why BBJ uses them, presumably. He's showing how to use a basic program with unlimited registers and basic instructions, (n+ etc) may create addition, multiplication, exponents, etc --but the idealized abacus is not limited by hardware, etc. I realize you are probably aware of that, but my point was that BBJ sort of expands on Turing
J—
I took down the hw solution.
Here's the deal. If you consider number theoretic functions, e.g., one-argument functions from the natural numbers to the natural numbers, then these models are equivalent in the sense that they compute exactly the same (partial) functions. Underneath this, they have radically different ways of representing those numbers, etc., but they still compute the same functions.
That said, they can be quite different in terms of complexity, although these models are all computably related. Indeed, if you allow TMs to do IO with binary representations rather than just unary representations (this typically requires a three letter tape alphabet, or an extra level of encoding), and you apply appropriate costs to machines on the other architecture (e.g., addition should be billed according to the sum of the logarithms of the numbers being added), they're polynomially related. Which is to say, e.g., that there exists a polynomial p such that if computing a given function t(n) requires T(n) many steps on a RAM (= abacus machine), then it requires p(T(n)) steps on a TM.
Another big difference is in terms of ease of programming. Most textbooks work pretty hard to show that a few basic functions are TM computable. Usually just enough to argue that TMs can simulate some more easily programmed system (most often the Kleene mu-calculus, in one guise or another, but sometimes RAMs). Once this is done, you can argue that a given function is computable by TMs simply by showing it is computable by RAMs, RASPs, whatever. But the circle can be closed. You can show that RAMs or the mu-calculus can simulate TMs. So the models of computation are all equivalent in one important sense, although different in a couple of senses that are unimportant for logical development.
For a long time, there was a cottage industry in considering variant TM models, e.g., multiple tapes, multi-dimensional tapes, etc. These additions add no computational power, but they provide lots of exercises for students in CS-oriented computability theory classes.
Well, the undecidability problem concerned functions, arguments--not PA, or foundations, so much. Goedel of course worked with the analysis (and working against Russell/Whitehead's logicism in PM, which you sort of overlooked) ;but Church and Turing were sort of hammering out early computability (and dealing with the implications of incompleteness)
TM predates the digital era, and BBJ are aware of that. The acabus programs are closer to random-access and computers, and encapsulate the TM: Jeffrey establishes that (actually, his earlier logical work via Church's thesis does). I approach it via logic, then computing (then mathematics). The point re undecidability does not lack for philosophical interest as well.
Well, the undecidability problem concerned functions, arguments--not PA, or foundations, so much.
I'd phrase this differently :-).
A decidability problem P consists of a set of instances S, together with unary relation R on S. Formally, you're obligated to give an encoding of the instances to make them suitable for input to your favorite computational model, but it's generally pretty clear how to do this, and the details of the encoding hardly ever matter, so this detail is usually glossed over. Let's not for a moment, and let e denote the encoding function.
The question, then, is whether or not there exists a total, 0-1 valued total computable function D such that
forall x \in S. D(e(x)) = 1 iff R(x).
If we gloss over the detail of the encoding function, this amounts to asking whether the characteristic function of R is computable.
If so, we call P decidable, if not, undecidable.
Computability theorists, logicians, etc., have characterized a large number of decision problems according to whether or not they're decidable.
For example, Pressburger arithmetic (this is the theory of the natural numbers under addition [but not multiplication]) is decidable.
By this, I mean the problem P that whose instances are first order formulae in the language of {0,S,+}, and where R is the "is true in of the natural numbers" is decidable, and the encoding is via Gödel numbers of formulae.
Likewise, the first order theories of the real and complex numbers under {0,+,*} are decidable.
Peano Arithmetic is not decidable. The proof, of course, has its origins in the Incompleteness Theorem, which pretty much got this ball rolling (modulo Church's work on the lambda calculus, and Schönfinkle's combinatory calculus).
The halting problem (e.g., phrased in terms of instances consisting of TMs and their inputs, and some straightforward encoding of both) is undecidable. The totality problem (given a TM, does it halt on all inputs) is undecidable, and in fact, \Pi_2 complete in a more refined classification. In fact, Rice's Theorem says that any non-trivial property of programs in extension is not decidable. (By this, I mean that the relation R has the property that if e and f are programs computing the same function, then R(e) iff R(f), and that there is at least one program in R, and one program not in R.)
Goedel of course worked with the analysis (and working against Russell/Whitehead's logicism in PM, which you sort of overlooked)
The Russell-Whitehead theorems remained true. But Gödel wrecked Hilbert's program, and with it the goal of efforts of Russell and Whitehead, who were trying to carry out that program.
but Church and Turing were sort of hammering out early computability (and dealing with the implications of incompleteness)
This is clearer in Turing's case than Church's, although certainly Kleene's work certainly called attention to the computational potential of the lambda-calculus. I think, also, the extreme simplicity of the proof of the fixed-point theorem in the lambda-calculus was influential. I don't know who did that—it might well have been Church.
BTW, I met Kleene, but somehow never crossed paths with Church. Too bad, because my work on randomness in the early 80's (as a computational concept) was closely related to work he'd done in the 40's.
Looking back on much of this history, the lambda-calculus anticipated (and indeed, served as the inspiration) for Lisp and subsequent functional languages (like ML and Haskell).
Kleene's mu-calculus is finds modern descendants in the so-called "algebraic" programming languages, like Algol or C. Indeed, to a first approximation, primitive recursion equates to a for-loop in Pascal or Algol (these languages required a bound on the number of times through the loop when you entered it, unlike the for-loops in C), and minimization equates to while loops in these languages.
And TMs and RAMs (the later, a reduction of von Neumann architecture to a mathematical model) are closely related to assembly languages.
Indeed, even the humble combinatory calculus now finds application in Wadler abstract machines, which are basically the target model for compilation of lazy functional languages like Haskell.
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