
Merit is very hard to judge.
In sports, there is the notion of points scored that can separate someone like Michael Jordan from someone like Hanno Mottila (Mottila was a Finn who played for a couple of years with the Atlanta Hawks). Mottila was extremely talented, but next to Jordan, he came off as almost crippled.
Or differently abled.
Or otherwise gifted.
Suffice it to say he was making about 6 points a game, and his team was losing almost every game, and he ended up back in Finland. Still, I was a fan of his because he was the only Finn to make it into the NBA and my wife is a beautiful Finn.
Outside of sports, we can look at cars, and their respective merits. The Russian car called the Lada fell apart at the slightest touch. Doors fell off. But it didn't cost much. You could buy a new one for about a thousand dollars back in the 1990s in Finland. Low cost has its merits, and it might trump the fact that the doors would fall off if you hit a pothole in the middle of winter. It was kind of fun to get out and put them back on.
In America, the car I own now (Dodge Caravan) has certain merits. It is easy to repair. They are not as expensive as a Toyota Sienna or a Honda and they're American, so if you buy one, you're helping the people in Detroit remain employed.
You can look in Consumer Reports April Edition and see the merits of a given set of cars.
When you get to an empirical thing -- an ice scraper, for instance, you want it to be able to scrape the ice off your windshield and yet not scratch the actual glass. You want it to be strong enough not to break. You don't want it to be so ugly that you can't stand having it between the front seats, where such things usually sit through the winter season.
When it comes to morality, this becomes harder to assess. Because morality isn't what is seen, it's what isn't seen. All of us until two months ago thought that Tiger Woods was a moral being. Then suddenly he was morally crazy on most scorecards: lying to his wife, paying for hookers, sacking up with at least a dozen women concurrently and telling them all he loved them truly.
With Allen Ginsberg, many of us had the sense that he was a moral person. But toward the end of his life it became increasingly apparent that he was a member of NAMBLA, and in his last book are two poems that solidify that notion.
Morality is not so much what you do when you can be seen, it's what you do when you don't think anybody is looking.
But even so, we can't judge Ginsberg's entire life on the basis of his being a member of NAMBLA. He had other sides to his life. Let's try to see all of it. We don't even know if he hurt small children, or what his commitment to NAMBLA really meant. Plus, he wrote some wonderful poems, and was fairly nice to Gregory Corso, among other things.
Judgment of others' morality is easy to do if you're willing to bear false witness. We bear false witness when we focus on one thing about another person, and say it's the entirety. You can say that so and so is a monstrous racist because they think that Obama is a socialist. You can say that someone hates all people of disability because they haven't been convinced by the aesthetic merits of Larry Eigner's poems. You can argue that because someone doesn't like Sarah Palin, they hate all women.
These gambits are tried all the time, and I find them somewhat appalling, and yet probably no worse than any other kind of "thought," that comes trotting along in the guise of truth while actually pushing any kind of convenient lie that makes the money spin -- whether it's global warming, or whatever you want Sarah Palin to be in terms of your politics -- whether it's Peg Bundy or a mental imbecile or a moral genius (it's possible to bear false witness by taking too good a view of someone in order to convince others, too, isn't it? Is it possible for instance to put Larry Eigner next to Shakespeare and claim they are equivalent in terms of their accomplishment?).
Total depravity is often seen not only in the judged, but in the judger, and even (and especially) when the judgement is a positive one.
More serious, and perhaps hopeless in terms of the ability to judge its merit, is aesthetic reception. The drawings of Pierre Klossowski, for instance, are probably not as subtle or as fluid as the drawings of his brother Balthus. But because Klossowski was also a philosopher who focused on the ways in which the virtuous hide their vices behind a wall of self-righteousness (the face behind the face), I find him rather Lutheran in the way he ferreted out sin. And this capacity helps me to see his merit (see drawing above).
Others might just think -- well, others draw BETTER, or others are not as pornographic.
Aesthetic merit is probably more impossible to decide than moral merit, and the two are easily confused.
The moralistic recovery system in which black, Asian, Hispanic and other writers are rapidly being recuperated depends for its success on the notion that these writers were not taken seriously in their own day. Zora Neale Hurston, however, was taken seriously, but she disappeared after a morals charge eclipsed her career when she was tried for molesting a small boy. The charge was dropped, but the threat to her reputation lingered, and she ended up in an unmarked grave. It may also be that the vogue for the Harlem Renaissance petered out during the Depression (I haven't looked hard into the nature of her particular eclipse).
An eclipse can easily happen, just as a person can attain prominence for spurious reasons.
Some want to dispense altogether with any universal notions of merit that might underwrite a meritocracy, and decide simply on politics.
In the 1950s, McCarthyism eclipsed many writers in Hollywood. And, in the Soviet Union, to be thought to be non-communist, meant a death sentence in almost every case. Even keeping a private diary, or telling a joke (Ivan Denisovitch's crime), could mean you were -- in basketball parlance -- benched for years.
But those writers who managed to publish in spite of this terror -- Solzhenitsyn -- for instance, were vaulted to the very front lines of prominence -- again irrespective of the aesthetic merits of their work (I find his work to be a bit too long and uniformly grim and I can't get through it any more than I can get through the insanely long and humorless books of Marcel Proust). Solzhenitsyn got a lot of play on the American side during the Cold War, but I doubt if anybody reads the guy for fun.
If blacks, women, and other ethnicities and genders can say we were eclipsed, and have it matter, so that whole departments of study are formed around their works, then it creates a motivation to gain a back door to brilliance. Disabled writers along the lines of Larry Eigner are now forming into blocks, with disabled critics demanding a reading with an unparalleled virulence. (I inquired into Eigner's aesthetic power about a year ago on Ron Silliman's blog, and the enmity at the time was only via the amateurs -- now the professionals are weighing in!).
I'm still not convinced that the minimalists of the seventies were very important writers. One of my commenters -- Curtis Faville -- has recently published the Complete Works of Eigner -- and I hesitate to judge -- but from what I've read of Eigner's -- I don't want to read this book. Eigner is great on occasion -- and he's got some of the power of say, Robert Creeley (also disabled because he had only one eye to work with but whose work I also find difficult to read) -- I have never seen the merit of either writer as being on a scale with a poet like Marianne Moore. I don't see a giant scaffolding of ideas, for instance, or a deep taproot. I see hilarity, and exquisite beauty, but in a very minor mode. Other poets who worked in the seventies in this school -- Richard Brautigan (I love his short fiction, but don't feel that his poems amount to much), or Tom Clark, or Anselm Hollo, or Larry Fagin, or Joel Oppenheimer, just don't have the ambition of someone like Marianne Moore or -- going back -- to even a poet like Henry J.-M. Levet. And in at least some ways, they were all disabled. Brautigan suffered from very serious depression of the kind that led to his suicide. Anselm Hollo was writing in a second language. Larry Fagin wasn't all that gifted. Oppenheimer was lazy, and preferred to drink. Of these, however, I think Eigner (from what I've read) is the most ambitious upon occasion, and the most interesting, and perhaps had the soundest mind, in spite of suffering from Cerebral Palsy. But I often wonder to what extent any of these writers wanted to be GREAT. Maybe they just wanted to be minor. Or great, in the way a candy bar tastes great (to quote the comic book artist Lynda Barry).
That, in fact, may be part of their charm. They may have the relationship to great writers that Lucky Charms have to a 5-star French restaurant, and perhaps it is wrong to judge them from the perspective of the Michelin guide.
At least for me, it's hard to know how to take it seriously unless I take it seriously.
On the other hand, a poet like Charles Olson had a very ambitious mind -- but again, I find him to be missing any deep engagement with religion, so the work seems slight, and without any serious framework (I think a writer can only write well within a deep religious tradition -- a writer who leaves such a tradition and goes off on their own is not writing to millions of others -- but is merely autonomous -- and crippled or disabled by their not working within a vast group). It would be like praying alone as opposed to belonging in a congregation, or singing a song to oneself, as opposed to singing a song for others, and really trying to communicate something.
If religion is a person's driving concern -- the most important thing in a life -- the highwater mark of one's existence, and the only thing that finally truly matters -- writers who don't engage with that subject lose merit (I find it hard to take Ezra Pound or ee cummings seriously for similar reasons). They might have other merits, but not the chief one that I am looking for.
For yet other critics -- it may be that engagement with race, or gender, or disability issues -- are the most important aspect of a writer. That, to them, is their religion -- their point of highest value.
And for some readers -- it may be that irreligious artifacts help them with their irreligious existence (Mencken appeals to some for precisely this reason).
All these ways of reading have their merits.
As a Lutheran reader, I'm often looking for religious thought, but I also want humor because I think that without that you don't have much of a persepctive. And yet feel that I must speak across an enormous chasm to the irreligious, or to those whose sense of religion is so different from my own.
At least so far it is still a democracy. It is still a sense of virtue I think to reach across the chasm to try to find the merits of a person -- and to not forget that in spite of everything else -- Tiger Woods had a mean 5-wood, and incredible putts that would roll incredibly over a green before dropping into the cup. And at least he didn't kill anybody, and there were no children involved. These days, that's huge.
Even Hitler had his merits as a watercolorist -- however minor his art might have been.
That he killed upwards of 30 million people and disrupted all of Europe for ten years and more probably does outweigh those remarkable watercolors in terms of assessing his overall merit. But let's never say that he was all bad. He could give a speech, for instance. Many of us are afraid to stand up and give a speech. Not Hitler! He could give a speech to millions and not suffer an instant of bashfulness!
In assessing merit, let's try to see the whole of a person, and not just one thing about them that we want to wring their neck for, and for which we want to make them into an example. That, at least, is my New Year's Resolution. Now let's see how well I stick with it.
Jesus was able to do that with the thief next to him on the cross, and forgave him. It's an amazing thing to be able to forgive. But, then, he was God. I'm just a mortal. I struggle with forgiveness, and I am not a universalist. Should I be?
I think just as only some books should get into the canon, only some people should get into heaven. And merit has to be part of that discussion.






